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ABSTRACT 
 
An in depth evaluation of safety is an essential component of the successful 
operation of nuclear facilities.  The Safety Assessment Methodology is the tool 
applied to perform the safety evaluations of a facility in order to demonstrate 
satisfactory safety of such a facility to the operator, the National Nuclear 
Regulator (NNR) in South Africa, and to the public. 
 
A Safety Assessment is performed and documented to demonstrate the 
compliance with safety objectives, principles and criteria as stipulated by national 
and international standards.  In South Africa the Department of Mineral and 
Energy publishes the National Nuclear Regulatory Requirements for 
demonstrating safety of a Nuclear Facility. As such, this Safety Assessment 
provides a formal structured procedure for defining the logic of systems and 
assessing the consequences if failure in the control logic occurs. 
 
This Safety Assessment demonstrates that the radioactive effluent generated at a 
typical nuclear facility the South African Nuclear Energy Corporation (Necsa) is 
managed according to national and internationally acceptable proven technology 
and standards.  Those standards are documented in the National Nuclear 
Regulatory Act.  Licensing documents have been issued by the Regulator to guide 
the holder of a nuclear installation licence to compile a Safety Assessment.  
International standards are provided by the International Atomic Energy 
Association (IAEA) through a number of technical documents and the Safety 
Standards Series. 
 
This Safety Assessment aims to show that the Radioactive Effluent Treatment 
Facility at Necsa can be operated without endangering the lives of the operators 
and the public and without having adverse effects on the environment.  The 
hazards of operating a Radioactive Effluent Treatment Facility include 
radiological, chemical and conventional hazards.  However, this Safety 
Assessment only focuses on the radiological (radiation and contamination) 
hazards and, in particular on the radiological hazards associated with the 
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accidental exposure of an operator to Medium Activity Effluent. 
This report demonstrates the safety condition of the Radioactive Effluent 
Treatment Facility at Necsa by providing: 
1. a systematic evaluation of consequences in the case of accidental exposure 
and 
2. a documented demonstration of the controls in place to ensure that the 
workers, members of the public and environment are protected 
sufficiently, with the main focus being on worker exposure. 
 
The justification of the discharge of treated radioactive effluent into the 
environment is a globally accepted practice.  This Safety Assessment briefly 
discusses environmental discharge practices but the main focus is on the analysis 
of the protection of the workers of the Radioactive Effluent Treatment Facility.  
The radioactive effluent is only discharged into the nearby Crocodile River if it is 
in compliance with discharge criteria as set by the National Nuclear Regulator and 
the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry. 
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GLOSSARY 
 
For the purpose of this document, the following terms shall have the meanings 
given in the table below: 
 
Advanced Gas 
Cooled Reactor 
A term used for the second generation of British Power 
Reactors, now operated by British Energy. The fuel used in 
the reactor is slightly enriched uranium oxide clad in 
stainless steel. The coolant is carbon dioxide and the 
moderator is graphite 
Accident / 
Incident or 
Event 
 
 
(Nuclear 
accident)  
Any unintended event, including operating errors, 
equipment failures or other mishaps, the consequences or 
potential consequences of which are not negligible from the 
point of view of protection or safety. 
 
Any accident involving facilities or activities from which a 
release of radioactive material occurs or is likely to occur 
and which has resulted or may result in an international 
trans-boundary release that could be of radiological safety 
significance for another State. 
ALARA An approach to control or manage radiation exposures 
(both individual and collective to the workforce and the 
public) and releases of radioactive material to the 
environment as low as social, technical, economic, 
practical, and public policy considerations permit. ALARA 
is not a dose limit; it is a practice that has as its objective 
the attainment of dose levels as far below applicable limits 
as possible (see Appendix A). 
Analysis / 
Assessment 
A method for determining and evaluating the detailed 
performance of a process. 
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Anticipated 
operational 
occurrence 
An operational process deviating from normal operation 
which is expected to occur at least once during the 
operating lifetime of a facility but which, in view of 
appropriate design provisions, does not cause any 
significant damage to items important to safety nor lead to 
accident conditions. 
Critical group Group of people representative of those individuals in the 
population expected to receive the highest annual dose, 
which is a small enough group to be relatively 
homogeneous with respect to age, diet and those aspects of 
behaviour that affect the annual dose received. 
The mean dose of this group is compared with dose limits. 
Deterministic 
effects 
The radiation effect for which generally a threshold level of 
dose exists above which the sensitivity of the effect is 
greater for a higher dose. 
Dose A measure of the radiation received or absorbed by a target.  
The quantities termed absorbed dose, organ dose, 
equivalent does, effective dose, committed equivalent dose 
or committed effective dose are used, depending on the 
context.   
Epidemiological 
studies 
The studies of radiological factors affecting the health and 
illness of populations, and serves as the foundation and 
logic of interventions made in the interest of public health 
and preventive medicine.  
Exposure 
pathways 
The routes or more strictly environmental processes by 
which people are exposed to radiation. 
External events Events originating outside the nuclear installation with the 
potential to cause adverse conditions or even damage to 
safety important structures, systems or components.  
Facility Buildings, containers or equipment in which a process is 
conducted. 
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Generator Any facility that produces waste or where the waste 
originates from.  
HAZOP A HAZOP (Hazard and Operability study) is a method for 
systematically identifying hazards and operational 
problems for intended new facilities or the modification to 
existing facilities or equipment. 
Internal events Events originating inside the nuclear installation with the 
potential to cause adverse conditions or even damage to 
safety important structures, systems or components. 
Magnox 
Reactor 
A term for the first generation of British power reactors (at 
Berkeley, Bradwell, Calder Hall, Chapelcross, Dungeness 
A, Hinkley Point A, Hunterston A, Oldbury, Sizewell A, 
Trawsfynydd and Wylfa) from the use of "Magnox" as the 
Cladding Material. 
Operating 
Technical 
Specifications  
A set of rules setting forth parameter limits, the 
functional capability and the performance levels of 
equipment and personnel approved by the regulatory 
body for safe operation of an authorized facility. 
Probabilistic 
Risk 
Assessment 
Methodology provided for a formal structured procedure 
for defining the functional logic of the identification of 
initiating events and risk determination. 
Process Safety A discipline that focuses on the prevention of explosions, 
accidental releases or the unsafe handling of radioactive 
substances. 
Process The activity involving any radioactive materials, including 
their use, manufacturing, transportation, and storage, or the 
combination of such activities. 
Radioactive 
effluent 
treatment 
facility  
A facility designed to manage the radioactive liquid waste 
in order to discharge the treated effluent to the environment 
within approved release limits. 
Risk Risk = Probability x Consequence 
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Safety The expectation that a process will not lead to a state in 
which any human life or the environment is adversely 
affected. 
Safety 
Assessment 
An assessment of all aspects of a practice that area relevant 
in protection and safety; for an authorised facility, this 
includes siting, design and operation of the facility. A 
Safety Assessment is a collection of arguments and 
evidence in support of the safety of a practice. 
Safety 
Assessment 
methodology 
The methodology applied during the compilation of a 
Safety Assessment is the assumption of possible deviations 
that could occur during the operation of a facility and the 
associated consequences when such deviations occur.  
Various techniques and safety evaluation processes are 
applied to identify such possible deviations or initiating 
events and allocate a risk to such deviations based on 
consequences and likelihood of occurring. 
Single-failure 
events 
 Events caused by the failure of a single control. 
Source Term The amount, and isotopic composition of material released 
(or postulated to be released) from a nuclear installation or 
action as well as the release characteristics and associated 
data required for the impact analysis. 
Storage The holding of waste in a facility that provides for its 
containment, with the intention of retrieval. 
Stochastic 
effects 
The health effects, the probability of occurrence of which is 
greater for a higher radiation dose and the severity of which 
(if it occurs) is independent of dose and generally occurs 
without a threshold. 
Waste Material in gaseous, liquid or solid form and in 
concentrations or forms that do not permit economic 
recovery and that are designated for disposal. 
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ABBREVIATIONS  
 
ALARA As Low As Reasonable Achievable 
BNFL British Nuclear Fuels 
DAC Derived Air Concentration  
DOH Department of Health 
DWAF Department of Water Affairs and Forestry 
FMEA Failure Mode Effective Analysis 
HAZOP Hazard and operability study 
HL Hazard Level 
HVL Half Value Layer  
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency 
ICRP International Commission on Radiological Protection 
INES International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale  
IROFS Items Relied on for Safety 
LA Low Activity  
MA Medium Activity 
NECSA South Africa Nuclear Energy Corporation 
NNR National Nuclear Regulator 
NORM Natural Occurring Radioactive Material 
OTS Operating Technical Specifications  
PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
QP Quality Plan 
QRA Quantitative Risk Assessment  
RPO Radiation Protection Officer 
SFL Springfields Fuels Limited 
SHE Safety, Health and Environment  
TLD Thermoluminescent dosimeter  
TVL Tenth Value Layer  
1 
 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW OF THE NECSA 
RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT TREATMENT FACILITY 
AND COMPARISON WITH SIMILAR NATIONAL 
AND INTERNATIONAL FACILITIES 
 
Nuclear power is a reliable source of clean energy and is largely considered as the 
answer to the energy threat experienced globally.  There is still significant 
opposition to nuclear power based on safety grounds, but it is generally 
considered to be a much less significant contributor to global warming than many 
other existing means of electricity generation.  From a public perception the use of 
nuclear power is unsafe due to a number of events and general ignorance. 
 
The holders of Nuclear Site Licences face the challenge of creating a positive 
public perception associated with nuclear energy.  They need to demonstrate 
safety through the application of various safety methodologies [1-6].  The holders 
of Nuclear Site Licences are obliged to have adequate capability within their own 
organisations and to take steps to retain this capability that enables them to 
understand the nuclear safety requirements of all its activities and to demonstrate 
adherence to these requirements on national and international levels. 
 
The holders of Nuclear Site Licences (including the nuclear design engineers and 
the operators of the nuclear facilities) in conjunction with the Nuclear Regulators 
of each country are faced with the question as to whether a facility is acceptable 
from a nuclear safety perspective to allow it to be designed, constructed, 
commissioned, operated and decommissioned.  The demonstration of adequate 
safety is a very challenging problem to the nuclear industry as a whole and to 
South Africa Nuclear Energy Corporation (Necsa) in particular.  It must be 
demonstrated that the safety of nuclear facilities are in compliance with national 
and internationally acceptable standards in such a way that the South African 
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operator, the National Nuclear Regulator (NNR) and the public will be satisfied. 
 
The negative perception caused by the well known Chernobyl nuclear accident 
and a few other smaller nuclear accidents have resulted in the global stagnation of 
the nuclear industry.  The so called “nuclear winter” is over and the whole world 
is entering an exciting nuclear renaissance.  Nuclear accidents must be prevented 
at all cost to ensure development and to prevent any interruptions in nuclear 
research programmes. 
 
Public perception and acceptance of the application of nuclear 
technology 
 
Nuclear technology involving radioactive material also contributes to the well-
being of people through medical applications.  Two different applications of 
nuclear technology are applicable in the medical field i.e.  Radiation Therapy and 
Radiology. 
 
Radiation Therapy (also known as Radiotherapy or Radiation Oncology) is the 
medical use of ionizing radiation as part of cancer treatment to control malignant 
cells. Radiotherapy may be used for palliative treatment (where cure is not 
possible and the aim is for local disease control or symptomatic relief acting as a 
painkiller) or as therapeutic treatment (where the therapy has survival benefit and 
it can be curative). 
 
Radiology is the medical specialty of directing medical imaging technologies to 
diagnose diseases.  Originally it was the aspect of medical science dealing with 
the medical use of electromagnetic energy emitted by X-ray machines or other 
such radiation producing devices for the purpose of obtaining visual information 
as part of medical imaging.  Modern day radiological imaging is no longer limited 
to the use of X-rays, and now includes technology-intensive imaging with high 
frequency sound waves, magnetic fields and radioactivity 
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The use of nuclear technology through medical applications is, however, more 
acceptable to the public due to healing effects and the possible prevention of death 
caused by cancer due to its early diagnoses and treatment.  A large fraction of the 
population receives nuclear medicine examinations every year.  The part of the 
U.S.A. population that receives nuclear medicine examinations has been 
characterised by age and sex.  Males received 42% of examinations while females 
received 58%.  More than one-third of the examinations were done on persons 
older than 64 year of age and more than two-thirds on patients older than 45 years 
of age.  The effective dose equivalent from nuclear medicine procedures can be 
compared with the 2 mSv from natural background [7]. 
 
Industrial activities or practices, in radiological as well as the chemical industries, 
are also associated with risk but the acceptance by the public and regulators 
requires a higher level of justification than for medical applications.  Radiation 
Protection is based on the concept of trade-offs, of balancing risks against 
benefits. A patient undergoing radiation treatment may be subjected to relatively 
high doses.  However, this increased risk is tolerated, because the benefits 
provided to the patient by the treatment are judged to outweigh any harm that 
might be caused by the increased risk. 
 
Justification of Practices 
 
Practices are more radiological specific and are defined as deliberate human 
activities which, as a by-product, result in increased exposure of individuals or 
populations. In principle, these can be designed and operated to meet requirements 
for radiological protection that are specified in advance.  The International 
Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) defines the justification of a 
Practice stating that “no Practice involving exposures to radiation should be 
adopted unless it produces sufficient benefit to the exposed individuals or to 
society to offset the radiation detriment it causes” [8]. 
 
  
4 
 
The system of radiological protection recommended by ICRP for proposed and 
continuing Practices has the following principles: 
• The process of justification is required not only when a new Practice is 
being introduced, but also when an existing practice is being reviewed in 
the light of new information about its efficiency or consequences.   
• If such a review indicates that a Practice no longer produces sufficient 
benefit to offset the detriment, withdrawal of the Practice should be 
considered.  
 
The performance of a Safety Assessment is one way to determine if a Practice 
should be terminated or if it can continue operating. 
 
Industrial activities envisage continuous improvements through the development 
of technology specifically focused on improving safety measures.  As explained 
previously it is essential to demonstrate that the radiological risk associated with a 
facility is managed in such a way that it will not adversely affect the health of the 
workers and the public or the environment.  As part of the ICRP principles it is 
also required to demonstrate on a regular basis that the practice is still justifiable. 
 
Description of Necsa  
 
Necsa, also well known as Pelindaba, [9] is located on the farm Weldaba and 
covers an area of approximately 24 km2.  As indicated in Fig. 1.1, it is located in 
the North West Province of South Africa.  The topography of the Necsa site is 
hilly to mountainous with great differences in the elevation and steep surface 
slope gradients to the north and south.    
  
Necsa is a Multi-facility Nuclear Site that operates the processes involved in the 
front end of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle and, therefore, excludes the reprocessing of 
spent fuel [9]. 
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Figure 1.1:  Map of North West Province and Gauteng showing Necsa relative to 
Pretoria and Johannesburg. 
 
The South African nuclear programme started in 1948 and focussed on research 
and development in military applications and in the Nuclear Fuel Cycle.  One of 
the highlights in the history of Necsa was the successful separation of uranium 
isotopes and the start of the Uranium Enrichment Programme [9, 39]. 
 
Figure 1.2 is a view over the eastern part of the Necsa site.  The Radioactive 
Effluent Treatment Facility is situated in the eastern part of the Necsa site. In the 
early 1970s a uranium conversion plant and a uranium enrichment plant were 
constructed on the Necsa site.    The enriched uranium was used as fuel for the 
Research Reactor SAFARI-1, the nuclear power plant at Koeberg and for military 
purposes.  Various other small research projects and laboratories were initiated 
during that time also focussing on the Nuclear Fuel Cycle.  Many of the facilities 
generated radioactive waste (solid, liquid and gaseous).  Most of the radioactive 
liquid (effluent) waste was and is treated on the Necsa site in the Radioactive 
Effluent Treatment Facility.  It should be noted that the solid and gaseous 
Necsa site (Pelindaba) 
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radioactive wastes are managed through other processes and are not included in 
this Safety Assessment.  Various chemical facilities are also operating on the 
Necsa site but non-radioactive chemical effluent is not treated at the Radioactive 
Effluent Treatment Facility.  Non-radioactive chemical effluent is treated by 
independent, certified, waste contracting companies. 
 
 
Figure 1.2:  View of the eastern part of the Necsa site where the Radioactive 
Effluent Treatment facility is located. 
 
The Necsa site incorporates hilly terrain and the position of the building that 
houses the Radioactive Effluent Treatment Facility is situated slightly lower than 
most of the neighbouring facilities.  The hilly terrain is clearly visible in Fig. 1.3 
where the light brown indicates the lower contours and the dark brown colours 
indicate the hilly areas. Figure 1.3 shows that the ground slopes towards the 
Radioactive Effluent Treatment Facility, thus allowing most of the liquid effluent 
to be received mainly from gravity-fed drains.  Some liquid waste is, however, 
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pumped and some is transported by tanker to the Radioactive Effluent Treatment 
Facility.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3:  Topographical contour map of part of Necsa showing that the 
Radioactive Effluent Treatment Facility is situated lower that most 
of the other facilities.  
 
The discharge of treated effluent to the nearby Crocodile River is also by gravity 
feed.  The river is approximately 1 km from the facility and the nearest public road 
is approximately 1.3 km from the Radioactive Effluent Treatment Facility.  The 
Necsa site was selected and justified for suitability due to its stable geological 
characteristics and central location near to but not too close to fast developing 
industries in the Gauteng area. 
Radioactive Effluent Treatment 
Facility 
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1.5.1 Description of the Radioactive Effluent Treatment Facility 
 
The Radioactive Effluent Treatment Facility receives and treats two types of 
effluent namely: 
i. Medium Activity Effluent and 
ii. Low Activity Effluent. 
 
The Medium Activity Effluent is define as the radioactive effluent for which the  
α-activity exceeds 100 Bqℓ-1 and the β--activity exceeds 4000 Bqℓ-1 when 
received from the different facilities, while the Low Activity Effluent is that for 
which the α-activity is between 10 and 100 Bqℓ-1 and the β--activity is between 40 
and 4000 Bqℓ-1.  These limits are referred to as the waste acceptance criteria of 
the Radioactive Effluent Treatment Facility.  If the radioactive effluent at the 
facility where it is generated does not comply with this waste acceptance criteria 
the effluent will not be accepted by the Radioactive Effluent Treatment Facility.  
Transfer is managed by the workers of the Radioactive Effluent Treatment 
Facility.  Sometimes the generators of the radioactive effluent must store the 
radioactive effluent for some time to allow sufficient decay (cooling down period) 
to enable them to release the radioactive effluent to the Radioactive Effluent 
Treatment Facility.  The waste acceptance criteria were determined by evaluating 
the decontamination effectiveness of the Radioactive Effluent Treatment Facility, 
the shielding design and the Regulator’s agreed effluent discharged limits.   
 
i. Medium Activity Effluent treatment process 
Medium Activity Effluent is received from the various generators.  The effluent is 
fed through pipelines from reception tanks at the facilities to the Medium Activity 
Effluent reception tanks.  The Medium Activity Effluent facility consists of a 
reception system, a storage system and an evaporator system with sub systems as 
indicated in Fig. 1.4.  Each of these systems is operated according to a specific 
control logic operating valves, instruments and pumps. These systems are also 
supported by safety systems i.e ventilation, shielding, containment systems and 
analytical systems.   
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Figure 1.4:  Block diagram showing basic treatment steps and integration of the 
Medium Activity and Low Activity Effluent treatment facilities.  
 
Separate Collection 
Tanks for Medium 
Activity and Low 
Activity Effluent at the 
generators 
Medium Activity 
Effluent 
Reception system 
Low Activity 
Effluent 
Reception 
system 
 
Medium Activity 
Effluent Storage 
system 
 
Evaporator 
system 
Chemical 
Precipitation 
 
Low Activity 
Effluent 
Storage system 
pH 
adjustment 
(Chemical 
Treatment) 
Condensate 
collection 
system 
Concentrate 
collection system.  
(Concentrate is 
sent for 
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Solid Radioactive 
Waste) 
Final 
Monitoring 
Discharge 
into the 
nearby 
Crocodile 
River 
Precipitate 
Sludge 
Beds 
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The pH of the received Medium Activity Effluent is measured and adjusted by the 
addition of acidic or alkaline reagents into the storage system.  The pH is adjusted 
in order to ensure effective decontamination in the evaporator.   The function of 
the evaporator is to decontaminate the Medium Activity Effluent.  The 
evaporation process results in the activity being concentrated at the bottom of the 
evaporator and cleaner condensate is captured at the top of the evaporator.   
Condensate from the evaporator is then pumped to the Medium Activity Effluent 
condensate monitoring tanks and the concentrate is pumped to the concentrate 
collection tank after each evaporation cycle.  The condensate from the evaporator 
is treated as Low Activity Effluent and the concentrate from the evaporator is 
treated and conditioned as solid radioactive waste which is sent to another facility 
and managed as solid radioactive waste. 
 
The radiation protection programme for the occupational exposure of workers 
under normal operation of the Medium Activity Effluent facility will be described 
to confirm compliance with the international standards as stipulated in Refs [4, 5, 
6].  Worker exposure due to an event at the Medium Activity Effluent process is 
analysed in detail in this Safety Assessment. 
 
ii. Low Activity Effluent treatment process 
Low Activity Effluent is also received through pipelines from the different 
facilities on the Necsa site.  If the Low Activity Effluent from the generator does 
not conform to the Waste Acceptance Criteria it will be treated as Medium 
Activity Effluent.  The Low Activity Effluent is treated through a chemical 
precipitation process.  The precipitate generated in the Low Activity Effluent 
facility is flushed into radioactive sludge drying beds.  The precipitate is treated 
as solid radioactive waste.  The Low Activity Effluent is fed to holding tanks 
where it is sampled and discharged into the Crocodile River if it conforms to 
discharge criteria as authorised by the Regulator and the Department of Water 
Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) according to internationally accepted annual 
discharge limits based on ICRP recommendations [8]. 
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Decontamination of the Low Activity Effluent is done at the Radioactive Effluent 
Treatment Facility:   
• to ensure that there is a single point of controlled and monitored discharge 
of radioactive effluent into the environment and 
• as an ALARA principle (see Appendix A) application because most of the 
Low Activity Effluent  received at the Radioactive Effluent Treatment 
Facility is already in compliance with the authorised discharge criteria.   
 
Although specific limits are authorised by the NNR, Necsa is obliged to 
investigate the ALARA principles [5] and implement methods and measures to 
ensure the continual reduction in discharge of radioactive material into the 
environment. 
 
In general, the aim of ALARA is to minimize the risk of radioactive exposure or 
amount of dose while keeping in mind that some exposure may be acceptable in 
order to continue with the process actions.   Radiology and other practices that 
involve the use of radiation bring benefits to population, so reducing radiation 
exposure can reduce the effectiveness of a medical practice. The economic cost, 
for example, of adding a barrier against radiation must also be considered when 
applying the ALARA principle.  However, the obligation to apply ALARA at 
Necsa and other nuclear facilities is higher, especially when considering dose to 
the public.  The compromising of ALARA in the medical industry as well as the 
application in the nuclear industry with regard to the workers can be justified 
because exposure is agreed on by the receiver where as exposure to the public is 
not agreed on. 
 
This compromise is well illustrated in radiology. The application of radiation can 
aid the patient by providing doctors and other health-care professionals with a 
medical diagnosis, but the exposure should be reasonably low enough to keep the 
statistical probability of cancers or stochastic effects below an acceptable level, 
and to eliminate deterministic effects. 
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The obligation at Necsa is dictated by the ALARA policy that is based on the 
principle that any amount of radiation exposure, no matter how small, can 
increase the chance of negative biological effects such as cancer, though perhaps 
by a negligible amount. It is also based on the principle that the probability of the 
occurrence of negative effects of radiation exposure increases with cumulative 
lifetime dose. 
 
Description of a Similar National Waste Management Process 
 
Currently, there are various sites or facilities in South Africa that are under 
specific authorisation of the NNR and Department of Health (e.g. iThemba LABS, 
hospitals, mines etc.) that generate radioactive effluent.  In this report the Koeberg 
Nuclear Power Station will be used as comparison for Necsa practices [10]. 
 
 
Figure 1.5:  Koeberg Nuclear Power Station on the Cape West Coast. 
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Koeberg Nuclear Power Station is situated on the Cape West Coast, 
approximately 30 km north from Cape Town and is operated under NNR licence. 
The Koeberg Power Station as illustrated in Fig. 1.5, was visited in January 2008 
by the author to compare the Necsa Safety Assessment methodology with the 
Koeberg Safety Assessment methodology.  
 
Recently, Koeberg undertook a site-specific study applying the principles, 
methodologies and techniques developed internationally (UK specifically) in the 
field of Public Dose Assessments [11, 12].  Koeberg identified a Critical Group 
that would be affected by the radioactive sources and exposure pathways from the 
Koeberg Nuclear Power Station.  The identification of a Critical Groups was done 
in compliance with international and national Critical Group requirements. 
Control of radioactive waste disposal to the environment, based on the 
recommendations of the ICRP, necessitates an identification of the Critical Group 
of members of the public exposed from a given practice. Criteria for identification 
of Critical Groups were based mainly on ICRP recommendations but newer 
techniques were also applied to recent surveys of fish and shellfish consumption 
in the coastal area of the North-East Irish Sea during the Koeberg site-specific 
study [13]. 
 
Koeberg also did a comprehensive Safety Assessment [14] of all the activities at 
Koeberg by applying a similar methodology as described in this report.  As such, 
this Safety Assessment is reviewed and revised in accordance with a schedule 
agreed on between Koeberg and the NNR.  It should be noted that Necsa has the 
SAFARI-1 Research Reactor with various other research facilities but the overall 
risk factor associated with a research facility is less than the risk factor allocated 
to a Nuclear Power Station [1]. 
 
Koeberg has a well established worker monitoring programme that is in line with 
the ICRP recommendations as stated in Ref [15, 16].  In addition, Koeberg has a 
Whole Body Counter (WBC) on site and their occupationally exposed workers are 
subjected to a Medical Surveillance Programme similar to the Necsa programme.  
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There are also excellent worker training programmes in place and a simulation 
centre where operators are continually trained and retrained under normal and 
abnormal operating conditions.  These quality assurance procedures are in place to 
ensure that the Safety Assessment does not become obsolete.  More detail of what 
is required in such quality assurance procedures is described in this report. 
 
In comparison, Necsa is a multi-facility radiological site with diverse processes 
that generates various radioactive waste streams whereas Koeberg has well 
defined waste streams with limited deviations generated by the single Practice.  
Deviations in the radioactive effluent waste streams at Koeberg are only foreseen 
during abnormal situations. 
Koeberg discharges radioactive effluent through two main streams:  
i. batch discharges and  
ii. continuous discharges. 
 
i. Batch discharges 
Each batch is analysed prior to discharge for all possible nuclides as identified by 
Koeberg and the NNR for normal as well as abnormal operation.  If all the 
radionuclides are within the required limits the batch is isolated from any 
additional inflow and released to the Atlantic Ocean. 
 
Operating technical specifications are applicable to allow release (e.g. minimum 
operation of two circulation pumps to ensure sufficient dilution).  Koeberg’s 
release limits were determined in a comprehensive study done on the marine life 
and the testing for a wide range of radionuclides.  The limits set for release are 
still much lower than the detection limits of any of these radionuclides in the 
marine life.  The measured values of the actual released effluent [14] are again 
much lower than the permitted values. 
 
ii. Continuous discharges 
The continuous discharge stream is typical effluent generated in non-process areas 
or at secondary loops that are not directly into contact with the process side.  It is 
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very unlikely that this stream will have high levels of contamination.  The 
continuous discharge stream is, however, analysed with inline monitors that give 
readouts every 8 minutes.  Should an inline monitor detects values out of range it 
will automatically redirect the discharge stream to holding tanks. 
 
Description of a Similar International Waste Management 
Process 
 
The Springfields Nuclear Fuel Cycle facility in the UK was visited in March 2008 
by the author in order to become familiar with their practices and more specific 
their Effluent Waste Management Programme.  Springfields site is located 
between Preston and Blackpool, approximately 8 km west of Preston, in 
Lancashire and has an area of approximately 1 km2 (83 hectares).  Springfields 
manufactures nuclear fuel products for the UK’s nuclear power stations and for 
other international customers. Fuel manufacture is scheduled to continue until 
2023. In addition to fuel manufacturing, Springfields is also undertaking 
decommissioning activities and has decommissioned various nuclear facilities and 
to date 87 buildings have been fully demolished [17]. 
 
The operations at Springfields UK are similar to those of Necsa although 
Springfields operations are currently not as diverse due to limited research and 
development work being performed there.  The site dates from the Second World 
War and has been owned respectively by the United Kingdom Atomic Energy 
Association (UKAEA), British Nuclear Fuel (BNFL) and the Nuclear 
Decommissioning Authority (NDA).  The plant is currently operated by 
Springfields Fuel Limited and managed by Westinghouse Electrical UK limited 
on behalf of the NDA. 
 
Due to the war effort, the Springfields site became involved in the early stages of 
the United Kingdom military nuclear programmes.  A civil nuclear programme 
was run in parallel with the military nuclear programme and the first fuel elements 
for both the Windscale Piles and the Calder Hall Magnox reactors were produced. 
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In the early 2000s the Springfields site was the sole manufacturer of nuclear fuel 
for the UK’s Advanced Gas-cooled Reactor and Magnox reactors.  Springfields 
also supplied fuel for the Light Water Reactor at Sizewell B as well as for export.  
Following the closure of the Magnox reactors the Springfield site embarked on an 
“oxide only” contract and started with the decommissioning of the rest of the 
facility. 
 
Unlike Necsa, the Springfields operations do not include the operation of a 
Research Reactor.  The Springfields operations briefly comprise of the following 
where the process steps shown in italics generate radioactive effluent: 
• uranium extraction from the uranium ore (U3O8) by adding nitric acid 
forming a uranyl nitrate UO2(NO3)2 liquid solution, 
• uranium extraction from uranyl nitrate solution by addition of organic 
solvent and heat to obtain uranium trioxide (UO3), 
• reduction of uranium trioxide with hydrogen gas to form uranium dioxide 
(UO2) by calcinations in a hydrogen environment, 
• formation of uranium tetrafluoride (UF4)by reaction with hydrofluoric 
acid and 
• formation of natural uranium hexafluoride (UF6) by the reaction with 
fluorine gas. 
 
The natural uranium hexafluoride is sent off site to be enriched by Urenco at 
Capenhurst in the UK.  The enriched uranium is then returned to Springfields for 
further processing, including the following: 
• the 5% enriched uranium hexafluoride (UF6) is hydrolysed and oxidised 
with steam and hydrogen at high temperatures to form uranium dioxide 
(UO2) powder and 
• the uranium dioxide (UO2) is pelletized and sintered and the pellets are 
loaded into stainless steel canisters. 
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The main difference between Necsa’s radioactive effluent treatment process and 
the Springfields process is that at Springfields the radioactive effluent treatment is 
treated up to release criteria at the source (at the process that generates the waste) 
whereas Necsa treats all the radioactive effluent at a central facility, the 
Radioactive Effluent Treatment Facility, and not at the source. 
 
The Springfields Fuels Limited discharge of radioactive effluent into the sea is 
managed at a single discharge point but there are no treatment steps at this point.  
Radioactive effluent can only be redirected to holding tanks and then returned to 
the process where it was generated if it is not in compliance.  It cannot be rectified 
to enable discharge at this point. 
 
For England and Wales, the Authorisations are issued and regulated by the 
Environment Agency and are reviewed at regular intervals.  The Radioactive 
Substances Act 1993 (RSA93) requires operators to have authorisation to dispose 
of radioactive waste from their sites. 
 
Springfields Fuels Limited was granted a certificate of Authorisation for the 
disposal of radioactive waste from their site, after the identification and 
implementation of a number of Improvement and Additional Information 
Requirements (IAIR’s).  Springfields Fuels Limited had to submit a full report of 
a comprehensive review of the means used to assess the activity of radionuclides 
in disposals and determine compliance with the authorisation including 
consideration of national and international developments in best practice. 
 
Springfields Fuels Limited has an Environment, Health, Safety and Quality policy 
briefly stating that the health and safety of their employees, the local community 
and the environment is Springfields Fuels Limited’s is very important.  They have 
implemented stringent conditions to ensure adherence to the Environment, Health, 
Safety and Quality policy and regulatory requirements as reflected in their site 
specific authorisation.  In addition Springfields has been striving in recent years to 
achieve and maintain ‘world-class’ environmental performance. This has been 
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recognised by the site being commended for its excellence in environmental 
management in RoSPA’s Dilmun International Environmental Award.  The site’s 
discharge Authorisation under the Radioactive Substances Act 1993 was reissued 
in 2005, coming into force on 2005/04/01 with the transfer to the NDA of site 
assets and the creation of a new company, Springfields Fuels Ltd (SFL). This 
Authorisation places a duty on SFL to minimise all discharges and emissions 
using Best Practicable Means (BPM) [18].  Springfields Fuels Limited produces 
an Annual Report to provide full details of their Environment, Health, Safety and 
Quality activities.  The latest (2007/08) Annual Report can be viewed for more 
information [17, 18]. 
 
Intention of a Safety Assessment 
 
The intention of any Safety Assessment is to deliver a documented demonstration 
to the National Nuclear Regulator, Necsa and the South African Public that the 
safety of the workers and the public is important and that exposure is managed.  
The Safety Assessment aims to provide a systematic evaluation of consequences 
of normal and abnormal operations.  It, therefore, also provides a management 
tool to ensure that the safety goals are met. 
 
This Safety Assessment covers the following aspects in order to demonstrate the 
safe operation of the Radioactive Effluent Treatment Facility:  
• Chapter 1 aims to introduce the reader to the Necsa Radioactive Effluent 
Treatment Facility as well as providing information on similar national 
and international facilities that were compared to the Necsa facility. 
• Chapter 2 aims to supply the reader with the theoretical considerations 
applicable to the Radioactive Effluent Treatment Facility.  Chapter 2 
explains the relevance of a Critical Group, the decay process of nuclides 
and the safety principle followed at the Radioactive Effluent treatment 
facility during normal operating conditions.  Chapter 2 gives a detailed 
description of worker protection and monitoring programme as required by 
the ICRP [15] that are implemented at Necsa. 
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• Chapter 3 aims to introduce the reader to the different steps followed when 
conducting a Safety Assessment and allocating a hazard levels to a nuclear 
facility.  Chapter 3 also gives a description of the Safety Assessment 
methodology. 
• Chapter 4 discusses the results of the Safety Assessment and presents 
conclusions. 
 
It should be noted that conventional and chemical hazards are not addressed in 
this Safety Assessment.  The Occupation Health and Safety Act of 1993, 
regulation 9 for Hazardous Chemical Substances [19], however, requires that an 
Occupation Health Risk Assessment must be performed on facilities and must 
address conventional and chemical hazards and the control program.  This 
Occupation Health Risk Assessment is a separate study done by an Occupational 
Health specialist. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
2.1 Normal operating conditions of Radioactive Effluent 
Treatment Facilities  
 
An inevitable part of any industrial process and in particular a nuclear process is 
the generation of waste.  Radioactive solid, liquid and gaseous waste is generated 
and treated by various processes that are agreed upon at an international level and 
are continually evaluated to ensure continuous improvement and development of 
future treatment processes. 
 
It is an accepted international practice to release treated radioactive effluent into 
the environment under controlled conditions [20].  The release criteria are site 
specific and the limits are determined by means of an assessment that is done on 
the impact that the discharged effluent will have on the environment and the 
public (Critical Group) of that area.  There are guidelines given by the IAEA [20] 
set as a highest proposed value but the identified Critical Group might have a 
significant influence on the site specific values.  Much lower values could be 
applicable to a specific site due to the specific behaviour habits of the Critical 
Group.   The characteristics of the discharged effluent, the geological/ 
meteorological behaviour of the area and Critical Group are unique to each area.  
It must also be clearly noted that the routine discharge limits are calculated and do 
not accommodate accidental discharge scenarios. 
 
2.2 Critical Group 
 
A Critical Group is defined as a small group of people being reasonably 
homogeneous with respect to its exposure for a given radiation source and given 
exposure pathway.  The identification of a Critical Group is required to enable the 
demonstration of compliance to the set national and international requirements 
[20].  An area around a nuclear facility is identified and within that area a 
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radiological habit survey is conducted.  Data with regard to eating habits, 
activities such as farming and recreational habits (e.g. housing, fishing, boating, 
skiing etc.) is collected and potential pathways of exposure are identified.  A 
pathway habit-profile is compiled and a cut-off limit to consumption and exposure 
time is set to the profile.  The individuals with the highest consumption rates or 
occupancy exposure time is then identified as the Critical Group all within the cut-
off limit set on the pathway habit-profile. 
 
Man-made radiation that includes radioactive elements called radionuclides which 
emit alpha, beta, or gamma radiation, or a combination of these types of radiation 
produced at nuclear facilities has the potential to reach the public through 
different pathways as shown in Fig. 2.1.  A pathway outlines the route which 
radionuclide contaminants may follow to reach the public.  Not all the pathways 
indicated in Fig. 2.1 are applicable to the Necsa site.  The pathways applicable to 
the Necsa site are indicated in red.  Radionuclides may enter the local 
environment by air or water.  The Public and more specifically the Critical Group 
could inhale radioactive elements from the air and from water vapour.  People 
could also absorb radiation from air or water through the skin or by drinking 
contaminated water.  Radionuclides released into the air or water can also pass 
through the soil, plants, or wildlife and reach the public through ingestion of crops 
and game animals. 
 
The primary potential pathways of radiation exposure to the Public include: 
• Air and wind transport via re-suspension of surface soil contamination 
from current or historic nuclear activities. 
• Discharge of radioactive effluent from nuclear facilities into rivers or the 
sea.  
• Movement through groundwater from near surface disposal, deep 
geological disposal or nuclear incidents that lead to the contamination of 
groundwater  
• Ingestion of contaminated game animals exposed to contaminated soils 
and plants on the nuclear site. 
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Figure 2.1:  Different pathways of radionuclides reaching the Public. 
 
2.3 Relevant nuclides at the Necsa site 
 
Medium Activity Effluent is mainly generated at the SAFARI-1 Research Reactor 
and the medical isotope manufacturing facilities.  The Medium Activity Effluent 
is produced in the primary cooling loop in the SAFARI-1 Research Reactor 
through the fission of uranium.  At the medical isotope manufacturing facilities 
nuclides are generated during the dissolving of the irradiated uranium target 
plates. 
 
When 235U undergoes fission (absorbs neutrons) inside the SAFARI-1 Research 
Near surface 
disposal 
Deep 
geological 
disposal 
and 
nuclear 
testing 
Discharge of radioactive 
effluent from nuclear 
facilities into nearby rivers 
or the ocean 
Air and wind transport via re-
suspension of surface soil 
contamination from current 
or historic nuclear activities/ 
occurrences  
Nuclear occurrences that 
lead to the contamination of 
groundwater 
Ingestion of contaminated 
game animals exposed to 
contaminated soils and 
plants on the nuclear site 
23 
 
Reactor during a controlled criticality cascade various fission nuclides or 
fragments are formed.  The average of the fragment mass is about 118, but very 
few fragments are found near 118.  The fission process leads typically to break up 
into two unequal mass fragments with the most probable fragment masses being 
around mass 95 and 137 as indicated in the fragment mass distribution shown in 
Fig. 2.2 [21]. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2:  Fission-product yields for thermal and 14 MeV fission neutrons in  
235U indicating a common pair of fragments and subsequent decay 
(taken from [21]). 
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By way of example, a common pair of fragments from 235U fission is 140Xe and 
94Sr formed in the following process: 
 
U$%& +  n →  U$%)  →  Xe*+, + Sr-+ +  2n.                                                       (2.1) 
 
These are indicated in Fig 2.2, but are not relevant to this Safety Assessment 
because of their short half-lives and the short half lives of their decay products 
and as such these fragments and their decay products never enter the Radioactive 
Effluent Treatment Facility. 
 
This particular set of fragments from 235U fission undergoes a series of β- decays 
to form stable end products.  Most of the fission fragments are highly unstable as 
shown in Fig 2.2.  140Xe is highly radioactive, and decays with a half-life of 14 s 
and finally produces the stable isotope 140Ce.  94Sr decays with a half-life of 75 s, 
finally producing the stable isotope 94Zr.  The many other fragment pairs produced 
in the fission process follow the same pattern of decay as in the example above 
and thus also do not enter the Radioactive Effluent Treatment Facility.  131I may 
give a higher initial dose, but its short half-life of 8 d ensures that it will soon 
disappear.  131I is one of the particularly relevant nuclides when considering 
medical radioactive effluent but not a relevant nuclide for Necsa radioactive 
effluent. 
 
2.5.1 2.3.1 Properties of 137Cs 
 
Produced in quantity and of particular concern is 137Cs, being the focus of this 
Research Report.  Caesium is a soft, malleable, silvery white metal and is one of 
only three metals that is a liquid at room temperature. 137Cs is the most dangerous 
radioisotope to the environment in terms of its long-term effects; it is water-
soluble and extremely toxic in minute amounts.  137Cs has an intermediate half-life 
of 30.32 y suggesting that it is not only highly radioactive but that it has a long 
enough half-life to be around for hundreds of years.  Besides its persistence and 
high activity, 137Cs has the further insidious property of being mistaken for 
potassium by living organisms and taken up as part of the fluid electrolytes. This 
25 
 
means that it is passed on up the food chain and re-concentrated from the 
environment by that process. The main health concern is associated with the 
increased likelihood for inducing cancer.  While in the body, caesium poses a 
health hazard both from beta and gamma radiation.  137Cs behaves in a manner 
similar to potassium and distributes uniformly throughout the body. 
Gastrointestinal absorption from food or water is the principal source of internally 
deposited 137Cs in the general population.  Essentially, all 137Cs ingested is 
absorbed into the bloodstream through the intestines. 137Cs tends to concentrate in 
muscle because of its relatively large mass. Like potassium, caesium is excreted 
from the body fairly quickly. In an adult, 10% is excreted with a biological half-
life of 2 d, and the rest leaves the body with a biological half-life of 110 d.  
Clearance from the body is somewhat quicker for children and adolescents. This 
means that if someone is exposed to radioactive caesium and the source of 
exposure is removed, much of the caesium will readily clear the body along the 
normal pathways for potassium excretion within several months [22].  
 
Various factors have been offered to explain and/or predict the wide variation in 
the retention of Cs among humans. The biological half-life of Cs has been 
expressed as an increasing function of body mass and also as an increasing 
function of age throughout life. Some early investigators attempted to describe 
accumulation of Cs in the body in terms of discrimination factors between Cs and 
the chemically similar element K, but such factors were found to oversimplify the 
relation between Cs and K and they were soon abandoned.  K may however be a 
useful index, for predicting the retention patterns of Cs in individuals. A 
predictive model for individuals is constructed, using observed relationships 
between the mass of total-body K (Kt) and the parameters in the standard two-
exponential retention model for Cs.  There is still a lot of uncertainty and 
assumptions are still made conservatively until more certainty is obtained [22]. 
Due to the nuclear weapons testing programs and nuclear power stations, 137Cs is 
of more concern in the United States of America (USA) than in the rest of the 
world. The USA has sponsored several studies to determine the health effects of 
137Cs [22]. 
26 
 
 
As mentioned, the isotope  137Cs has a half-life of 30.32 y and undergoes only β-
decays and has two branches.  In the one β- process (5% branching ratio) a β- 
particle is emitted with an endpoint energy of 1.170 MeV, producing 137Ba in its 
stable ground state.  In the other β- process (95% branching ratio) a β- particle 
with an endpoint energy of 0.510 MeV is emitted to produce 137mBa in a 
metastable state. The 137mBa in the metastable state then decays via isomeric 
transition with the emission of a γ -rays of energy 0.662 MeV. 137mBa in a 
metastable state has a half-life of 2.55 minutes and is responsible for the emission 
of γ −rays.  The decay scheme of 137Ba is shown in Fig. 2.3. 
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Figure 2.3:  Illustration of the decay scheme of 137Cs. 
 
The photon energy of 137Ba can be used in food irradiation, or in radiotherapy of 
cancers.  137Cs is also one of the most common radioisotopes used in the industry.  
Thousands of devices use 137Cs, for example: 
• moisture-density gauges, widely used in the construction industry, 
• leveling gauges, used in industries to detect liquid flow in pipes and tanks, 
• thickness gauges, for measuring thickness of sheet metal, paper, film and 
many other products and 
• well-logging devices in the drilling industry to help characterize rock 
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strata.  
 
2.4 Basic decay processes and biological significance  
 
3.5.1 2.4.1 Natural α-decay of uranium 
 
At this stage it must be clearly noted that the Medium Activity Effluent is mainly 
generated through the fission of 235U and not through the natural decay of 
uranium.  Naturally occurring uranium contains two main isotopes, 238U 
(99.275%) and 235U (0.72%).  Both isotopes are radioactive and, respectively, 
have the following half-lives, 4.468 x 109 y and 7.038 x 108 y [23]. 
 
There is however a third isotope of insignificant quantity 234U (0.005%), with a 
half-life of 2.48 x 105 y, much shorter than the age of the earth (4.5 x 109 y), and 
has therefore almost all decayed away. 
 
Both 235U and 238U form naturally occurring decay series starting with the α-decay 
of the parent nucleus to the corresponding daughter nucleus: 
 
U$%. →  Th$%+ + α  (0α = 4.267 MeV),                                                             (2.2) 
 
U$%& →  Th$%* + α  (06 =  4.679 MeV),                                                           (2.3) 
 
where Eα corresponds to the energy of the α-particle emitted.  The resulting 
daughter nuclei of the two decay series are also unstable and for 235U the series 
ends with stable 207Pb, while for 238U the series ends with the stable 206Pb.  This is 
achieved by α-decay or β- emission until stability is reached. 
 
The pre-formed α-particles are released from the unstable parent nucleus by a 
process of quantum mechanical tunneling through the Coulomb barrier.  Lower 
energy α-particles (Eα ≈ 4 MeV) are associated with very long half-lives 
(T½ ≈ 109 y) while higher energy α-particles (Eα ≈ 9 MeV) are associated with 
very short half-lives (T½ ≈ 1 ms).  In natural uranium, these decay chains 
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generally are in secular equilibrium. This means that in 1 g of natural uranium 
each nuclide of the 238 U series has an activity of 12 356 Bq and each nuclide of 
the 235U series an activity of 568 Bq.  However, the SAFARI-1 research reactor is 
loaded with enriched uranium fuel 235U (90%) and the target plates used in the 
medical isotope manufacturing are also made of enriched uranium 235U (46%).  
Figure 2.4 shows the 238U decay process.   
 
 
 
Figure 2.4:  238U decay series (times shown indicate the half-life of each daughter 
nucleus). 
 
An α-particle (4He nucleus) has a double positive charge and is highly ionizing as 
it slows down in matter. On living tissue an α-particle can have significant health 
effect; when interacting with living matter substantial destruction to molecules 
can be caused while slowing down to become a neutral helium atom.  The 
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concentration of α-emitters specified in the waste acceptance requirements is very 
low, because uranium containing effluent is not allowed in the Medium Activity 
Effluent facility due to the possible concentration of the 235U isotope in the 
evaporator that could lead to criticality.  The presence of uranium can be easily 
detected from its α-emission during sampling of the effluent prior to discharge to 
the Radioactive Effluent Treatment Facility.   
 
Health effects of α-emitters are not a major concern in the operation of the 
Radioactive Effluent Treatment Facility due to the very low probability for the 
presence of uranium that will result in a low probability of inhalation and 
ingestion.  As also previously mentioned, the concentration of α-emitters is 
limited due to a criticality hazard. The concentration of other α-emitting nuclides 
are minute and are not of concern to the workers health although the medical 
surveillance program for the workers of the Radioactive Effluent Treatment 
Facility is such that it will detect exposure to α-particles.  The medical 
surveillance program worker monitoring is explained in more detail at a later 
stage in this report. 
 
4.5.1 2.4.2  β-decay processes 
 
There are three common forms of beta decay: 
(a) β- - decay: (Electron emission,  a neutron turns into a proton) 
(b) β+ - decay: (Positron emission, a proton turns into a neutron) 
(c) Electron Capture. 
 
(a) β--decay  
Certain nuclei which have an excess of neutrons may attempt to reach stability by 
converting a neutron into a proton with the emission of an electron and an anti-
electron neutrino, v9:: 
 
n, →  p< + e= + v9:.                                                                                           (2.4) 
 
The electron is called a β--particle.   The electron does not exist inside the nucleus 
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but is spontaneously produced in the decay and is ejected.  The energy of the 
emitted electron is of concern to radiation protection.  
 
β
-
-decay occurs in 131I which decays into 131Xe.  The Mass Number in the case of 
electron emission remains the same and the Atomic Number increases by one 
which is characteristic of this type of decay.   The decay of 131I is not relevant to 
this Safety Assessment due to the short half live of 131I (T1/2 = 8 d), but it is a very 
relevant nuclide when considered in the medical treatment and diagnose process.  
The decay of 131I is another example of β--decay and is illustrated as follows: 
 
I&%
*%* →  Xe&+
*%* + e= + v9: .                                                                                  (2.5) 
 
Due to the three-body nature of the decay a continuous distribution of electron 
energy is produced up to the end point energy (typically ≈1 MeV), the Q-value of 
the reaction. 
  
(b) β+-decay 
When the number of protons in a nucleus is too large for the nucleus to be stable it 
may attempt to reach stability by converting a proton into a neutron with the 
emission of a positively-charged electron and an electron neutrino. The positron is 
the β+ particle. The Mass Number remains the same and the Atomic Number 
decreases by 1: 
  
p< → n, + e< + v:.                                                                                           (2.6) 
 
 A typical example of this type of decay occurs when 22Na which decays into 
22Ne:  
  
Na**
$$ → Ne*,
$$ +  e< + v@ .                                                                                   (2.7) 
 
Again as with β--decay, due to the three body nature of the decay a continuous 
distribution of positrons is produced upto the end point (typically ≈ 1 MeV), the 
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Q-value of the reaction.  It should be noted that the positron quickly annihilates 
with an electron to produce two γ-rays with an energy of 511 keV, the rest energy 
of the electron: 
 
e< +  e= →  2A.                                                                                                   (2.8) 
 
 (c) Electron Capture  
In this third form of beta decay an inner orbiting electron is attracted into an 
unstable nucleus where it combines with a proton to form a neutron. This process 
is also known as K-capture since the electron is often attracted from the K-orbit 
of the nucleus. The Mass Number is unchanged in this form of decay and the 
Atomic Number is decreased by 1:   
 
e= +  p< →  n, + v:.                                                                                          (2.9) 
 
A typical example of this type of radioactive decay occurs when 55Fe decays into 
55Mn: 
 
Fe$)
&& + C=  → Mn$&
&&  + v: .                                                                             (2.10) 
 
5.5.1 2.4.3  γ-decay  
 
The gamma decay process is the most prominent decay process of interest to the 
Radioactive Effluent Treatment Facility.   Gamma decay involves the emission of 
energy from an unstable nucleus in the form of electromagnetic radiation.  The 
radiation can be characterised in terms of its frequency, its wavelength and its 
energy. Very low energy electromagnetic radiation called radio waves, infra-red 
radiation at a slightly higher energy, visible light at a higher energy still, then 
ultra-violet radiation and the higher energy forms of this radiation are called X-
rays and γ-rays.  These radiations form what is called the Electromagnetic 
Spectrum.  The high energy radiated by X-rays and γ−rays is illustrated in        
Fig. 2.5.  The energy, frequency and wavelength of the radiation make up the 
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Electromagnetic Spectrum. The X- and γ-ray window has been used for diagnostic 
and therapeutic medical applications for over one hundred years. The Nuclear 
Magnetic Resonance (NMR) window has more recently found application in 
medicine and uses radio waves in an imaging technique called Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging (MRI). 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5:  Electromagnetic spectrum for radiation. 
 
All radioactive materials decay and eventually become stable, losing their harmful 
radiation characteristics.  However, the rate at which different forms of 
radioactive material decay varies enormously.  When radioactive materials enter 
the body, some will become harmless very quickly, whereas others may take so 
long to decay that they can remain active for the rest of a person’s life.  The type 
and energy of the radiation that it emits must be taken into account, along with the 
probability of the radioactive material being excreted from the body.  In the case 
of internal and external exposure, the fraction of radiation energy absorbed in the 
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body/organs must also be taken into account.  This concept is generally referred to 
as the effective half-life. The effective half-life for a radionuclide within the body 
is the period of time needed for the compound to be decreased by 50%.  This 
occurs due to the combined effect of the biological half-life and the physical half- 
life for the compound: 
• The biological half-life is the time required for half of the material to be 
eliminated from body through excretion in urine, stool, sweat or other 
routes. 
• The physical half-life is the time required for the compound to lose half of 
its activity through radioactive decay. 
 
2.5 Safety principles followed at the Necsa Radioactive Effluent 
Treatment Facility 
 
The radiological safety challenges of the Necsa Radioactive Effluent Treatment 
Facility are the management of radiation and airborne contamination hazards of 
the Medium Activity Effluent facility.  This Safety Assessment evaluates design 
safety principles as well as administrative safety principles applicable to the 
Radioactive Effluent Treatment Facility. 
 
The safety principle hierarchy followed for the Radioactive Effluent Treatment 
Facility to address the hazards was extended as far as practicable to the following: 
• selection of processes to eliminate hazards (this, however, was not 
entirely possible since the Radioactive Effluent Treatment Facility does 
not have control over the generation of Low Activity and Medium 
Activity Effluent), 
• passive control through design by the application of engineered features 
(e.g. shielding), 
• active control through design by the application of engineered features 
(e.g. ventilation) and 
• administrative controls by means of procedures although engineering 
controls provide better control than administrative controls it is not 
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always cost effective and practical to implement. 
 
There are four major ways to reduce radiation exposure to workers or to public: 
• Shielding: Use proper barriers to block or reduce ionizing radiation.  
• Time: Spend less time in radiation fields.  
• Distance: Increase distance between radioactive sources and workers or 
population.  
• Amount: Reduce the quantity of radioactive material for a practice.  
 
Of these four ways shielding as an engineering control is implemented  and as 
administrative control the time spend and reducing quantities are implemented at 
the Radioactive Effluent Treatment Facility.  
 
6.5.1 2.5.1 Passive controls applicable in the Radioactive Effluent 
Treatment Facility 
 
Shielding is a passive engineering control measure and is more effective than 
administrative controls.  All equipment containing Medium Activity Effluent are 
housed in cells providing sufficient shielding to ensure that operators will not be 
exposed to radiation levels (dose) higher than 1 µSvh-1 as stipulated by the 
Regulator outside the cells under normal operating conditions.   
 
Figure 2.6 shows the different shielding required for the protection against 
different radiation rays.  Shielding is only required for processes that emits γ-rays. 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.6:  Demonstration of 
 
Under conditions of good geometry, the attenuation of a beam of 
given by:  
 
D =  D,  C
=EF
,                                                                                               (2.11)
 
where t is the thickness of material and 
I0  is the intensity of radiation on the source side and 
that gets through (in the case of the Radioactive Effluent Treatment Facility it is 
limited to 1 µSvh-1 )
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different Shielding requirements.  
µ is the linear attenuation coefficient
I is the intensity of radiation 
. The value of 1 µSvh-1 is set as an ALARA objective
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all γ-rays 
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 [24]. 
 [40].  
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The limit for white classified radiological areas are less than 2.5 µSvh-1 [34].  The 
areas outside the cells are classified as white with no radiological control 
measures required with regard to occupational exposed workers. 
 
Shielding reduces the intensity of radiation exponentially depending on the 
thickness of the shielding material and the type of material.  The effectiveness of 
γ-ray shielding is frequently described in terms of the half value layer (HVL) or 
the tenth value layer (TVL).  The value layers are the thicknesses of an absorber 
that will reduce the γ radiation to half, and one tenth of its intensity respectively.   
 
The most effective gamma shields are materials which have a high density and 
high atomic number, such as lead, tungsten, and uranium among others.  
Generally speaking these materials are expensive, so, in situations where space is 
not a constraint and where structural strength is required, concrete is used even 
though it is a less effective shielding material.  Lead shields are frequently used 
where space is limited or where only a small area of absorber is required. When 
added thicknesses are used, the shielding multiplies.  The effectiveness of a 
shielding material in general increases with its density [24].  Approximate half-
value layer (HVL) and tenth-value layer (TVL) for lead and concrete as 
attenuation material against radiation from 137Cs are: 
• HVL in lead for 137Cs is 6.5 mm;  
• TVL in lead for 137Cs is 21 mm; 
• HVL in concrete for 137Cs is 48 mm;  
• TVL in concrete for 137Cs is 157 mm [24]. 
 
There are a few pipelines, which form part of the Medium Activity Effluent 
process, that are not shielded and access is limited by administrative controls.  The 
implementation of engineering control is investigated as part of continuous 
improvement actions and the application of ALARA.  Currently, the layout of 
unshielded pipelines inside the facility is such that it will not be possible to shield 
the pipelines with concrete in order to obtain sufficient shielding due to limited 
space.  It could, however, be possible to obtain sufficient shielding by using lead 
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as shielding material.  Shielding is required to protect the workers against the 
γ−rays that are emitted by 137Cs in the Medium Activity Effluent.   
 
A typical recommendation from this Safety Assessment could be to register a 
project to calculate the shielding required on the Medium Activity Effluent 
pipelines as a passive engineering control and to investigate implementation. 
 
7.5.1 2.5.2 Administrative control applicable in the Radioactive Effluent 
Treatment Facility 
 
The different areas inside the Radioactive Effluent Treatment Facility are zoned 
by permanent structures (walls with security controlled doors or step over 
benches) clearly indicating the boundaries of the different zones with the entrance 
and exit of each zone signposted.   Access to areas with high radiation levels 
(inside the cells) are not part of normal operation and access is only rendered 
under strict administrative controls.  Access is only required during the 
performance of ad hoc tasks and maintenance.  Control is such that events with a 
probability of 10-2 are covered under normal operations. 
 
Most of the areas inside the Radioactive Effluent Treatment Facility that contain 
Medium Activity Effluent have a radiation dose rate of  25 µSvh-1.  Access to 
these areas is restricted to Radioactive Effluent Treatment Facility workers only 
and they are under the specific medical surveillance programme.  Ad hoc entry by 
non-radiological workers is only allowed under controlled conditions.  Should 
maintenance on equipment be required in the restricted areas the equipment is 
conditioned (flushed and separately shielded) to lower radiation levels.  A 
radiological survey is performed prior to allowing maintenance workers in such 
areas.  After the radiological survey is performed, an ALARA review and dose 
budgeting are performed to ensure that the task will not result in exceeding dose 
constraints.  These tasks are continuously monitored by a facility Radiation 
Protection Officer (RPO). 
 
  
38 
 
Under normal operating conditions the contamination levels are controlled by 
ventilation and administrative controls.  The normal contamination levels are well 
controlled to below 0.4 Bqcm-2 for α and to below 4 Bqcm-2 for β and γ 
contamination.   Historically, the highest contamination levels found in any cell 
were 200 Bqcm-2 for α and 2000 Bqcm-2 for β/γ activity.  The areas with high 
contamination levels are decontaminated under the control of a Radiological 
Work Permit.  Areas are decontaminated as quick as possible after spillages or 
other causes of contamination above normal operating levels. 
 
The principles of ALARA for the workers are applied by limiting time spent in 
classified areas, reducing radiation levels prior to entering an area, monitoring 
worker exposure etc.  The ALARA objective for the workers of Necsa is that the 
average annual effective dose to the occupationally exposed workforce of Necsa 
shall not exceed 4 mSvy-1 [5].  The exposure dose level set by the ICRP is 
50 mSvy-1 [8] and the value set by the NNR is 20 mSvy-1. 
 
Necsa management and employees are fully aware of the need to avoid 
environmental damage, especially to the beautiful surroundings at Pelindaba.  
They are committed to manage the environmental effects of their nuclear, 
chemical and related activities so as to ensure sustainable development, and to 
protect the health and safety of their workers, and that of the public, by 
developing and operating waste management processes.  The Necsa website 
contains the Safety Health and Environment policy [9] and is available to the 
public. 
 
2.6 Medical surveillance and Worker Monitoring Program at the 
Necsa site 
 
The operators of the Radioactive Effluent Treatment Facility are all registered as 
occupational exposed workers and are subject to annual medical examination.  
The annual medical examination for radiation workers on the Necsa site differs 
from person to person.  Each radiological worker has a Person-Job Specification 
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to enable the Necsa Occupational Physician to determine the most appropriate 
medical examination programme as recommended in Refs. [8, 15]. 
The estimation of internal dose needs to be inferred from the measurement of 
activity in the individual (by in-vivo or in-vitro methods) or in the workplace 
environment [15].  Various methods exist that can be used to perform individual 
monitoring for intakes of radionuclides i.e. whole body counts, excreta 
monitoring, air sampling with personal air samplers or any combination of these 
techniques [25, 26].  The choice of a measurement technique is determined by 
several factors:  
• Radiation emitted by the radionuclide. 
• Metabolic behaviour of the contaminant. 
• Retention of the radionuclide in the body, taking into account, both 
biological clearance and radioactive decay.  
• Required frequency of measurements. 
• Sensitivity, availability and convenience of the appropriate measurement 
facilities. 
 
Figure 2.7:  Whole body counter used for internal monitoring. 
Sliding bed for easy patient 
Lung positioner accommodates up to 
four sodium iodide detector crystals 
Lung detector positioner mechanism 
with six degrees of freedom 
40 
 
The whole body counters are used in the nuclear industry as part of the medical 
surveillance programs.  Figure 2.8 is a photo of a whole body counter very similar 
to the one used by Necsa.  The advanced body counters can provide accurate and 
reliable measurements of uranium, plutonium and americium in the lungs and it 
can provide fast, accurate measurements of fission and activation products in the 
body. 
 
The whole body counters are installed in a well shielded box shielding equivalent 
to a minimum of 10 cm of low background steel. The shields reduce spectral 
background due to bremsstrahlung interactions from the naturally occurring 40K 
within the workers body.   The reduction or limiting of background helps to 
improve the detection capabilities of the detectors and reduce count times. The 
standard whole body counters include a lung counting detector positioning 
mechanism, a subject bed and a scanning whole body counting mechanism. The 
lung counting detector positioning mechanisms features six degrees of positioning 
freedom to allow accurate placement of the detectors over the lungs for improved 
detection limits. The lung counting detector positioning mechanism 
accommodates sodium iodide energy detector crystals  
 
During normal or routine counting situations the worker will be lying on the bed. 
The system operator will positions the detector array over the workers lungs and 
in uniform contact with the workers upper chest. The shield door of the box will 
be closed and the count can then start.  The whole body counter is controlled by 
software that will turn on the high voltage for the sodium iodide detectors; it 
controls the scanning mechanism for the sodium iodide detector and begins the 
data acquisition and spectral displays. When the count is done, the spectral data is 
stored, analyzed, the results displayed and/or printed, and any appropriate warning 
messages are generated to the system operator. This data will be store on the 
workers medical surveillance file and if any warning messages were generated an 
investigation will be launched and if necessary a nuclear occurrence will be 
registered. 
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The medical examination programme for the Radioactive Effluent Treatment 
Facility exposed personnel includes a whole body count, together with blood and 
urine sampling.  The combination as an annual examination is regarded as 
sufficient for the workers of the Radioactive Effluent Treatment Facility.  If 
exposure is suggested an ad hoc examination will be performed that will include a 
whole body count.  The main radionuclide of concern at the Radioactive Effluent 
Treatment Facility is 137Cs as explained previously.  Inhalation and ingestion of  
137Cs can be easily detected by the whole body counter, even if small amounts 
have entered the body. 
 
Different methods of adequate sensitivity are available and the general order of 
preference in terms of accuracy of interpretation is: 
• body activity measurements, 
• excreta analysis and 
• personal air sampling. 
 
Direct measurement of the body or organ (done by the whole body counter) 
provides a quick and convenient estimate of activity in the body/organ [16].  The 
whole body count is appropriate for the surveillance of the Radioactive Effluent 
Treatment Facility workers.  The whole body counter is an effective instrument 
for the detection of radionuclides that emit radiation that can penetrate through the 
body and be detected by the sodium iodide detectors.  In principle, this technique 
can be used for radionuclides that emit X-or γ-radiation or radionuclides that emit 
positrons, since they can be detected by measuring the annihilation photons 
mentioned in Section 2.4.2 (b), energetic β--particles that can be detected by 
measuring the bremsstrahlung and some α-emitters that can be detected by 
measuring their characteristic X-ray radiation that accompany the α-decay [16]. 
 
137Cs present in the Radioactive Effluent Treatment Facility, if inhaled and 
ingested will emit sufficient γ-radiation (see Section 2.3.1 and Fig. 2.3) that will 
be detected by the whole body counter even at intakes that are small compared to 
annual limits.  Necsa has a new whole body counter that can also detect long-lived 
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α-emitters well within the annual limits on intake, depending on the time lapse 
after intake and examination. 
 
As an additional precaution and application of ALARA, each operator working on 
the Radioactive Effluent Treatment Facility is issued with a Thermoluminescent 
dosimeter (TLD), see Fig. 2.8, which is replaced on a monthly basis.  TLDs are 
ideal for the use at the Radioactive Effluent Treatment Facility because the TLDs 
have the required sensitivity to detect the radiation.  TLDs can be re-used after 
analysis.  The TLD also provides a very suitable measurement of total 
accumulated dose over a period of exposure [27].  
 
 
 
Figure 2.8:  Thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD ). 
 
TLD detectors utilize the electron trapping process.  The material is selected so 
that electrons trapped as a result of exposure are stable at normal temperatures.  In 
the TLD mechanism, as illustrated in Fig 2.9 and Fig 2.10, there are insulators 
whose electrons are bound in the valence band at normal temperature.  During 
exposure to radiation, free electrons in the TLD crystals become trapped in lattice 
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imperfections.  Electrons are elevated from the valence to the conduction band, 
but are then captured at one of the trapping centres.  If the trap energy level is 
significantly below the conduction band, the probability per unit time that the 
electron will escape back to the conduction band is small at ordinary room 
temperature.  Exposure to a continuous source of radiation will only increase the 
number of trapped electrons.  The TLD will be activated from a state of 
equilibrium into a meta-stable state but on heating the TLD (typically to 300o C) it 
will be relaxed into the equilibrium state again. During this relaxation the 
electrons escape the traps and release visible light which can then be measured 
using a photomultiplier.  The amount of light detected is related to the radiation 
dose received by the TLD detector [27]. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
        
Eg ≈ 6 eV 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.9:  Energy band structure of electron trapping process in TLD detectors. 
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Figure 2.10:  Electron trapping used in TLD mechanism. 
 
Radiation detection equipment has gone through an amazing evolution in size 
reduction, sensitivity and power [28].  Since the turn of the century, digital signal 
processing technology has been steadily adopted in radiation monitoring 
equipment in order to make more accurate and precise measurements of radiation 
dose.  Figure 2.11 is a photograph of a detector functioning by digital signal 
processing.  Silicon semiconductor detectors and dosimeters, which can detect α, 
β
-
 and γ radiation as well as neutrons, are replacing the conventional radiation 
detectors in radiation monitoring systems. 
 
Conduction band 
Valence band 
 
Hole 
trap 
Electron 
trap 
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Figure 2.11:  Example of an electronic radiation monitoring device 
 
The main purpose of a personal dosimeter is to monitor the radiation dose of 
personnel on a day-to-day basis.  Besides routine monitoring, detectors are also 
used in personnel dosimetry for the determination of absorbed doses as a result of 
accidental exposure to radiation.  The cost of internal dosimetry monitoring 
programmes can be significantly greater than those for external dosimetry.  It is 
thus also important to implement the most suitable and effective routine 
monitoring programmes to ensure optimisation of cost. It is also important to 
select the correct radiation monitoring equipment. 
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2.7 Exposure pathways at the Necsa site 
 
Workers at the Radioactive Effluent Treatment Facility can be exposed to 
ionising radiation through inhalation and ingestion of radioactive particles 
causing internal irradiation of the body or external irradiation through nuclides 
emitting high-energy photons that can cause damage to the organs in the body by 
penetrating the body.  The Public can be exposed to ionising radiation from 
different sources and in different ways when radioactive material is discharged 
into the environment.  Radionuclides can be present in drinking water and people 
can be exposed by direct intake, or the water can be used to irrigate crop and 
people can be exposed indirectly by eating the food that was irrigated by the 
contaminated water.  The Public can even be exposed to external radiation when 
exposed the sources of radiation that emits high-energy photons for example 
from stolen sources.  These different ways or routes of exposure are referred to as 
exposure pathways.     
 
Mathematical models of radionuclide behaviour can be used to estimate the dose 
rates to affected people for accidental releases.  For a given release to the 
environment or into a facility, the first step in assessing radiation doses to people 
is usually to identify the exposure pathways by which those people are exposed 
to radiation.  It is preferable, and usually more accurate, to base estimates of 
doses on measured dose rates or on measurements of radionuclide concentrations 
in samples taken from environmental materials.  Mathematical models should 
only be used if no data are available or the available data is not sufficiently 
comprehensive.  Models are also to be used when a possible future practice that 
may release radionuclides into the environment, is being evaluated.  Furthermore, 
doses to the Public (collective doses) invariably have to be calculated using 
mathematical models since the doses are often delivered over large temporal and 
spatial scales.   
 
Radioactive material may be released to either the atmospheric or the aquatic 
environment and models are required to describe the transfer of radionuclides 
through the respective parts of the biosphere to people.  Radionuclides discharged to 
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the atmosphere are dispersed by normal atmospheric mixing processes such as 
movement of air due to temperature differences.   Airborne radionuclides can give 
rise to exposure by two principal routes (exposure pathways): external radiation by 
photons and electrons emitted as a result of the radioactive decay process and 
internal radiation following the intake of radionuclides.  Aerosol particles as a 
primary contamination is not addressed since aerosol and solid waste are excluded 
from this assessment. 
 
In the case of the Radioactive Effluent Treatment Facility, exposure to radionuclides 
due to airborne contamination is due to secondary exposure as a result of liquid 
effluent that dries producing aerosol particles that re-suspend to become airborne.  
Radionuclides that become airborne can be re-deposited from the atmosphere by 
impacting with the underlying surface or by rainfall.  This transfer onto land surfaces 
may lead to further exposure of people by the following three important routes:  
• external radiation from deposited activity, 
• internal radiation from inhalation of re-suspended activity or 
• internal radiation from ingestion of contaminated food or inadvertent ingestion 
of soil. 
 
The relative importance of these pathways depends on the radionuclide and the 
nature of the surface onto which the deposition occurs.  Appropriate dosimetric 
models and habit data are also required to determine individual and collective doses.  
In order to estimate collective doses, spatial distributions of population and 
agricultural production are required for the region of interest.   
 
Liquid radioactive effluents as in the case of the Radioactive Effluent Treatment 
Facility may be discharged to freshwater (particularly rivers e.g. the nearby 
Crocodile River), estuaries or the marine environment.  Radionuclides discharged to 
rivers are dispersed due to general water movements and sedimentation processes.  
In the case of the Radioactive Effluent Treatment Facility, the discharge limits were 
calculated on the dispersion taking the most conservative dilution factor into account 
over the past 20 years. 
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The principal routes leading to the exposure of people are:  
• external radiation from sediments, 
• ingestion of food obtained from the river, 
• drinking water taken from the river and 
• water used for irrigation of crops and pasture. 
 
By way of example, in the case of Koeberg Nuclear Power Station the large sea-
water volumes and the fact that two pumps are required to be in operation during 
discharge ensures a constant dilution factor and no conservative value has to be 
assumed and justified.  The local features of the environment at Koeberg Nuclear 
Power Station, in particular tidal currents and the degree of sedimentation, initially 
determine the dispersion of radionuclides discharged into the marine environment.  
General water movement and sedimentation processes in the larger sea and ocean 
masses influence subsequent dispersion.  There are again a number of pathways 
leading to the exposure of people including: 
• ingestion of marine foodstuffs, 
• external radiation from activity on beaches and 
• inhalation of sea-spray. 
 
None of these last pathways are relevant to the Necsa site. 
 
2.8 Dose constraints 
 
The NNR is responsible for specifying the value of dose constraints, although 
registrants or licensees may additionally specify them in their internal rules or 
systems as long as it does not exceed the levels set by the regulator.  When 
establishing the dose constraints for the Radioactive Effluent Treatment Facility 
the relevant sources were clearly described.  The ICRP recommendation [8] for an 
upper value for the dose constraint for waste management activities for members 
of the public of 300 µSvy-1 was not adopted by Necsa but a more conservative 
limit of 250 µSvy-1 [5].  This lower dose constraint for Necsa was set by the NNR.  
It is general practice to set lower values for the dose constraint by regulatory 
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authorities for particular situations or types of installation and as an application of 
ALARA.  The lower dose constraint for Necsa also influences the choice of the 
Radioactive Effluent Treatment Facility value.  The lower value for a dose 
constraint reflects the need to ensure that the dose to the Critical Group now and 
in the future is unlikely to exceed the dose limit.  Doses expected to be incurred 
by the Critical Group from all other activities or sources on the site, to which they 
are also exposed, was taken into account. 
 
In setting values for the liquid and gaseous dose constraints, allowance has to be 
made for the relative contributions to the Public's dose from the two discharge 
modes (based on historical precedent), as well as for dose estimation uncertainties 
and the ALARA principle. The combined liquid plus gaseous discharge dose 
constraint is fixed (250 µSvy-1) as explained previously but the ratio of these 
doses is subject to review on a routine basis.  The values of these annual 
constraints are currently as follows [35]: 
• radioactive effluent discharges:   150 µSv 
• radioactive gaseous discharges:     50 µSv 
• dose margin, ALARA and uncertainties:    50 µSv. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DETERMINING THE PARAMETERS, EXECUTION 
AND COMPLETION OF THE SAFETY ASSESSMENT  
 
3.1 Introduction to Safety Assessment process steps 
 
A Safety Assessment consists of different process steps in order to evaluate the 
hazards and the various controls in place to manage the risk associated with these 
hazards for normal operation of a facility as well as accident conditions. 
 
The Safety Assessment for normal operation should address all the facility 
conditions under which systems and equipment are being operated as expected.  
This includes all the phases of operation for which a facility was designed to 
operate in the course of normal operation over the lifespan of the facility.  The 
effects of variations in the inputs (feed material, source material, etc.) on normal 
operations should also be considered. 
 
The objective of the Safety Assessment for normal operation should be to assess 
whether normal operation of the facility can be carried out safely, that is, whether 
radiological doses to workers and members of the public, and planned discharges 
of radioactive material from the facility, are within acceptable limits.  In addition, 
the Safety Assessment should establish any appropriate requirements and 
limitations for safe operation of the facility. 
 
The secondary objective of the Safety Assessment for normal operation is to 
identify the sources which could give rise to exposure to workers so that it can be 
included in the normal routine personnel monitoring programme.  The worker 
exposure for the Radioactive Effluent Treatment Facility is calculated as part of 
the Safety Assessment for normal operation. 
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The impact of an event such as the loss of containment is calculated as part of the 
Safety Assessment to determine if it is safe to operate the facility and that enough 
controls are in place to manage the risks.  Risks are conceived to be managed if 
the consequences of an event are acceptable and if not, the possibility of occurring 
has an acceptably low frequency as a result of the implementation of control 
measures ranging from engineering controls to administrative controls. 
 
As a general rule to comply with radiological risk requirements, the nuclear safety 
requirements (design and operational) would be more stringent for facilities 
posing a higher risk than for facilities posing a lower risk.  Facilities such as 
Nuclear Power Plants pose a higher risk than a radioactive waste management 
facility.   A Radioactive Effluent Treatment Facility poses a much lower risk to 
the workers or the Public than a Nuclear Power Station.  
 
Defence-in-Depth or different levels of protection requirements to illustrate that 
the possibility of a nuclear occurrence is very low or that the consequences will be 
managed to acceptable levels will not be the same for a Nuclear Power Plant and a 
small Laboratory set-up.  This approach is referred to as a hazard graded approach 
and was applied when performing this Safety Assessment.  
 
A hazard graded approach implies the initial determination of the hazard level of a 
facility or project.  When determining the hazard level there are a number of 
variables that will be used in the calculation, many of which are unique to a 
facility or specific site where the facility is housed [29].  An important variable, 
for example, is the meteorological conditions at the site that will have an influence 
on the dispersion calculations.  The meteorological data, e.g. the rainfall that 
affects the river flow pattern, have a significant impact on public exposure levels 
in the case of accidental and routine discharges.  During the calculation of the 
allowable discharge limits from the Necsa site, the nearby river flow pattern 
associated with the lowest rain fall over a period of five years was used to 
calculate the most conservative dilution factor. 
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Nuclear Facilities such as the Necsa Radioactive Effluent Treatment Facility 
conduct a wide variety of activities.  The activities of the Radioactive Effluent 
Treatment Facility range from simple reception of waste and analysis prior to 
discharge to the operation of a complex evaporator system.  Not all these activities 
will significantly contribute to a nuclear event.  It is necessary to avoid placing 
excessive requirements on simple or even trivial operations.  The facility must be 
divided into segments, defining the segments according to the hazards present in 
each segment.  If an event in one segment has no significant consequences and 
will not initiate an event in another segment it should not be included in the 
overall risk assessment.  The concept of independent Nuclear Facility segments is 
applied only when it is certain that there is no harmful interaction between the 
different segments during an event.  If a common initiating event can lead to the 
harmful interaction between the different segments the risk assessment should 
include the evaluation of all segments and the interaction between the segments.   
 
In the case of the Radioactive Effluent Treatment Facility at Necsa an analysis or 
risk assessment was performed on the Medium Activity Effluent process because 
it was identified as a segment that could give rise to a nuclear event with 
significant consequences but the consequences would not have harmful effects on 
the Low Activity Effluent process or segment.    
 
The Safety Assessment comprises of a dose assessment for the normal operation 
of the facility as well as the dose assessment for developed accident scenarios.  
The process steps for a Safety Assessment are shown in Fig 3.1.   
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Figure 3.1:  Flow diagram of process steps for a Safety Assessment. 
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The flow logic of a Safety Assessment can be summarised as follows: 
• Facility Description:  a detail description of the facility to be assessed must 
be compiled.  The boundaries of the Safety Assessment must be determined 
as described later in this Chapter in section 3.3.1  
• Plant conditions: distinguish between normal operations and accidents. 
• Normal Conditions: define the various process actions (Compile a work 
breakdown). 
 Perform a Dose Assessment for the different actions and determine 
the total dose to the Public and to a worker from all the actions.  It the 
dose to the public is less than 250 µSvy-1 and is less than 4 mSvy-1 for 
the worker the facility can be operated. No additional dose assessment 
is required.  If the dose to the Public is more than 150 µSvy-1 and 
more than 4 mSvy-1 for the worker the facility cannot be operated. 
The dose assessment must be repeated and mitigating factors (e.g.  
Engineering controls and Administrative controls) must be 
implemented.  This is an iterative process and must be repeated until 
the dose is acceptable.  The implementation of engineering controls is 
preferable above administrative controls.  
• Develop Accident Scenarios: realistic accident scenarios should be 
developed to determine the magnitude of the accident. 
 Perform a Determinist Analysis for the various accident scenarios and 
determine the dose to the Public and the workers. If the dose to the 
public is less than 1 mSv for the event and less than 20 mSv for the 
worker the facility can be graded as a Hazard Level 0 facility and no 
additional analysis is required. If the dose to the public is more than    
1 mSv and more than 20 mSv for the worker the facility is graded as a 
Hazard Level 1-3 depending on the results of the analysis.  A 
detailed probabilistic analysis should be performed and if required 
additional controls should be implemented should the outcome of the 
probabilistic analysis be not satisfactory 
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3.2 Hazard level determination 
 
The hazard level of a facility can be determined by developing a scenario of the 
serious accident or event that could be possible in a facility with the highest or 
most serious consequences.  A loss of inventory was assumed for the Radioactive 
Effluent Treatment Facility at Necsa.  The event can be categorised to determine 
the seriousness of such an event.  An international event rating scale has been 
developed based on past events experienced in the nuclear industry globally.   
 
The International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES) [30], as adopted 
by the IAEA is a worldwide tool for communicating to the public in a consistent 
way the safety significance of a nuclear event.  The INES explains the 
significance of events from a range of activities, including industrial and medical 
use of radiation sources, operations at nuclear facilities and transport of 
radioactive materials. 
 
The events are classified on the seven point scale as shown in Fig. 3.2.  Levels 1-3 
are called incidents; Levels 4-7 are called accidents.  The scale is designed so that 
the severity of an event is about ten times greater for each increase in level of the 
scale.  Events without safety significance are called deviations and are classified 
below scale or Level 0.  Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 give a summary of typical 
nuclear events in each category [30]. 
 
INES classifies a nuclear event at nuclear facilities as an incident or accidents by 
considering the three areas of impact as shown in Table 3.1: 
• People and the Environment covers the radiation doses to people close to 
the location of the event and the widespread, unplanned release of 
radioactive material from an installation.  
• Radiological Barriers and Control covers events without any direct 
impact on people or the environment and only applies inside major 
facilities.  It covers unplanned high radiation levels and spread of significant 
quantities of radioactive materials confined within the installation. 
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• Defence-in-Depth also covers events without any direct impact on people 
or the environment, but for which the range of measures put in place to 
prevent accidents that did not function as intended.  
 
INES classifies nuclear events that involve radiation sources and transport by 
considering only two of the areas of impact (People and the Environment and 
Defence-in-Depth) as shown in Table 3.2. 
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Figure 3.2:  The International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale. 
 
 
 
SERIOUS ACCIDENT 
ACCIDENT WITH WIDER 
CONSEQUENCES 
ACCIDENT WITH LOCAL 
CONSEQUENCES 
SERIOUS INCIDENT  
7 
6 
MAJOR ACCIDENT 
5 
4 
3 
2 
 
1 ANOMALY 
INCIDENT 
NO SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE                        Below Scale/Level 0 
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Table 3.1:  Examples of Events at Nuclear Facilities.  
 
INES 
Scale People and Environment 
Radiological 
Barriers and Control Defence-in-Depth 
7 Chernobyl, 1986 – 
Widespread health and 
environmental effect 
External release of a 
significant fraction of 
reactor core inventory. 
  
6 Kyshlym, Russia, 1957 – 
Significant release of 
radioactive material to the 
environment from explosion 
or a high activity waste tank. 
  
5 Windscale Pile, UK, 1957 – 
Release of radioactive 
material to the environment 
following a fire in a reactor 
core. 
Three Mile Island, 
USA, 1979 – Severe 
damage to the 
reactor core. 
 
4 Tokaimura, Japan, 1999 – 
Fatal overexposures of 
workers following a 
criticality event  at a nuclear 
facility. 
Saint Laurent des 
Eaux, France, 1980 – 
Melting of one 
channel of fuel in the 
reactor with no 
release outside the 
site. 
 
3 No example available Sellafield, UK, 2005 
– Release of large 
quantities of 
radioactive material, 
contained within the 
installation. 
Vandellos, Spain, 
1989 – Near 
accident  caused  
by fire resulting in 
loss of safety 
systems at the 
nuclear power 
station. 
2 Atucha, Argentina, 2005 – 
Overexposure of a worker at 
a power reactor exceeding 
the annual limit. 
Cadarache, France, 
1993 – Spread of 
contamination to an 
area not expected by 
design. 
Forsmark, Sweden, 
2006 – Degraded 
safety functions for 
common cause 
failure in the 
emergency power 
supply system at 
nuclear power 
plant. 
1   Breach of 
operating limits at 
a nuclear facility. 
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Table 3.2:  Examples of Events Involving Radiation Sources and Transport.  
 
INES 
Scale 
People and Environment Defence-in-Depth 
7   
6   
5 Goiania Brazil, 1987 – Four people 
died and six received doses of a few 
Gy from an abandoned and ruptured 
highly radioactive 137Cs source. 
 
4 Fleurus, Belgium,2006 – Severe 
health effects for a worker at a 
commercial irradiation facility as a 
result of high doses of radiation. 
 
3 Yanango, Peru, 1999 – Incident 
with radiography source resulting in 
severe radiation burns. 
Ikitelli, Turkey, 1999 – Loss of a 
highly radioactive 60Co source. 
2 USA, 2005 – Overexposure of a 
radiographer exceeding the annual 
limit for radiation workers. 
France, 1995 – Failure of access 
control systems at accelerator 
facility. 
1  Theft of a moisture-density gauge. 
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8.5.1 3.2.1 Hazard level determination of the Radioactive Effluent 
Treatment Facility at Necsa 
 
The IAEA event rating was used as a basis to derive various hazard levels for the 
Radioactive Effluent Treatment Facility.  The INES, however, consists out of 7 
levels and is not practical to use when performing a Safety Assessment.  The 7 
levels can, however, be reduced to the 3 or 4 levels as described in this Safety 
Assessment only to classify the Nuclear Facility with regard to risk.  The 
accidents and events are still classified using the INES.  The hazard level of the 
various segments of the Radioactive Effluent Treatment Facility will be 
determined by applying the following criteria [37]: 
 
Hazard Level 0 (HL 0):  Segments where a nuclear event (incident or accident as 
defined in this document) is not possible or an unmitigated nuclear event cannot 
lead to a significant radiological dose that can be classified as a nuclear incident 
or accident.  Limited qualitative hazard analysis is required.  The emphasis is on 
safety management programmes that are required to be in place in accordance 
with the current status of the installation or project.  This includes ALARA. 
 
Hazard Level 1 (HL 1):  Segments where an unmitigated nuclear event is 
estimated to have only localised consequences at the facility itself, e.g. a worker 
who is present at the process where the event occurs, receives a dose that exceeds 
20 mSv but less than 50 mSv; no workers in other facilities on site are affected. 
There are no off-site consequences and no member of the public is exposed to 
annual normal operation dose constraint of 0.25 mSv.  A hazard analysis is 
performed that includes likelihood estimates of nuclear events.  
 
Hazard Level 2 (HL 2):  Segments where an unmitigated nuclear event is 
estimated to result in worker exposure above 50 mSv and/or public exposure 
above 0.25 mSv but less than 1 mSv.  Comprehensive but appropriate hazard and 
accident analyses are performed.  
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Hazard Level 3 (HL 3):  Segments where an unmitigated nuclear event is 
estimated to result in worker exposure above 50 mSv and/or public exposure 
above 1 mSv in a year as a result of the event.  Comprehensive hazard and 
accident analyses are required that includes a Probabilistic Risk Assessment.   
 
3.3 Safety Assessment Methodology 
 
Safety Assessments are performed to demonstrate the compliance with safety 
objectives, principles and criteria as stipulated by national and international 
standards in order to protect workers and members of the public.  This concept has 
been explained in detail in the previous sections but there are various acceptable 
Safety Assessment methodologies.  Two different approaches i.e. deterministic 
approach (no mitigation taken into account) and probabilistic approach will be 
discussed in this Safety Assessment.   
 
If the calculated dose due to accidental exposure (following deterministic 
approach) is not in compliance with the international and national standards it 
will be recalculated taking into account the preventative and mitigating measure 
(following probabilistic approach) and these measures will then be implemented 
to ensure compliance.  When taking preventative and mitigating measure into 
account while doing a probabilistic risk assessment, specific reliability factors are 
allocated to the different control measures.  The different control measures have 
different reliability factors due to specific failure rates of equipment.  These 
failure rates have been determined over years of operating specific equipment.  
Due to lack of operating history not all equipment has failure rates.  Engineering 
measures, passive, active and human intervention measures all bear different 
credibility. 
 
The probabilistic risk assessment approach is carried out through a systematic 
approach.  The two factors that determine the risk of an operation or facility are 
the probability of a failure occurring and the consequences should the failure 
occur.  The determination or calculation of the probability of failures of a facility 
is subject to engineering judgment, historical failure data and the number of 
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protection barriers in place to prevent a failure.  Various methods such as event 
trees and fault trees can be used to determine the probability of failure.  The 
consequence of a failure can usually be determined very accurately by the 
calculation of the Source Term.  The magnitude of the consequences can be 
changed by the implementation of mitigating engineering or administrative 
measures.   
 
9.5.1 3.3.1 Determining boundaries of the Safety Assessment  
 
Two different boundaries need to be determined during the performance of a 
Safety Assessment.  Firstly, the boundary of the facility that could be affected or 
the areas on which the facility could have an effect must be identified.  The 
second boundary of the Safety Assessment that needs to be identified is the 
boundary of uncertainty that will be subject to judgement.  The radius of impact is 
established by consequences judged to be significant. 
 
Boundary of the facility 
It must be determined whether a single, all-encompassing analysis should be made 
or if the system should be subdivide with a number of standalone analyses 
performed on the respective sections.  Large, single analyses are complex and 
bulky but include all interactions that can occur among systems.  Allowing 
subdivision into small independent studies reduces the complexity; however, it 
increases the possibility of excluding system interactions and common-cause 
effects or failures.  The recommended approach is to perform several independent 
analyses, but ensuring that both output and input of materials and energies that 
can affect each analysis are properly considered (correct identification of 
boundary of the Safety Assessment).  Material or energy can be released during an 
accident in a manner that can adversely affect people, equipment, processes, or the 
environment and if boundaries are unclear some of the effects or affected could be 
missed.  An overall boundary analysis is presented in Fig. 3.3. 
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Figure 3.3:  Illustration of an Overall Boundary Analysis.  
 
The different systems shown in Fig. 3.3 can be identified as follows: 
 
System A:  The energy or material released by an accident does not have an 
impact beyond the system boundary.  No other systems or facilities (outside the 
System A boundary) will have a direct effect on System A during an accident.  
The materials released from System A will not impact other systems, but do 
contribute to the impact on the overall analysis.  An independent analysis could be 
performed on System A with confidence. 
 
System B:  The energy released during an accident adversely impacts System C, 
and the materials released from System C adversely impact System B.  An 
example of such an occurrence is where the energy from a fire in system B is 
released to System C causing runaway chemical reaction that in return releases 
toxic material into System B.  Both Systems B and C should be included in the 
System A 
System B 
System C 
System D 
Energy 
E 
Material 
M 
Energy 
Material 
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same analyses to avoid omitting possible common-cause effects that the 
interactions might have. 
 
System C:  The material released from System C during an accident adversely 
impacts System B.  An example of such an occurrence is where the material from 
System C (toxic vapour from uncontrolled chemical release) is entrained in 
System B’s ventilation system causing the spread of toxic vapour into System B.  
Both Systems B and C should be included in the same analyses to avoid omitting 
possible common-cause effects that the interactions might have. 
 
System D:  The energy released during an accident adversely impacts System C.  
The materials released do not impact other systems, but do contribute to the 
impact on the overall analysis.  The effects of the energy released from this 
system define the envelope of the overall analysis.  System B is unaffected by the 
release from System D, however, the energy impact from System D to System C 
must be considered in the analysis of Systems C and B as a whole. 
 
Boundary of uncertainty  
It must be remembered that the judgement of scientists and engineers will always 
be a key attribute during the performance of any risk assessment process.  It is not 
always possible to demonstrate how far an overall plant design or an individual 
item will perform in extreme circumstances.  Judgement is then required. 
Judgement is also called upon for possible contingency that was left out during 
the estimates or calculations.  Judgement should always be on the conservative 
side and should be used to determine additional safety features to be built into the 
design to cater for the unexpected.  The inputs, judgement figures or assumptions 
used in the risk assessment process are used so that the actual probability of 
installation failure is generally lower than what emerges from the calculations.  
This principle is called conservatism in input data and assumptions.  Any 
assumptions made in performing the Safety Assessment should be explicitly 
documented and examined for reasonableness and relevancy.  It is, however, 
necessary to guard against over conservatism.  Quality control over documented 
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assumptions is easier and it will be easier to recognize any future changes that 
invalidate the assumptions and thus require modification to the Safety 
Assessment.  If specific initiating events are deemed not to be credible, e.g. below 
a defined cut-off frequency of 10-6 [37] per annum, are left out the assumptions 
made to justify the decision should also be explicitly documented. 
 
Additional safety features should specifically include greater robustness in design 
or provision of equipment or aim at redundancy in the design or provision of 
back-up equipment. These additional safety features or the provision of 
independent means of protection is the principle known as Defence-in-Depth.  
Defence-in-Depth will be described in more detail later on. 
 
10.5.1 3.3.2 Deterministic and Probabilistic Approaches 
 
The first step of a deterministic approach is to determine the Source Term of a 
facility.  The Source Term is the amount and isotopic composition of material 
released (or postulated to be released) from a facility.  The Source Term is 
determined on an unmitigated basis during an accidental release and exposure. 
 
Once the Source Term has been calculated the result must be used to calculate the 
potential dose to an operator or member of the public.  This dose will be an initial 
indication of the hazard level of the facility.  Should this result indicate 
significantly high levels, a comprehensive Safety Assessment should be 
performed on the facility to evaluate the probability of such exposure by taking 
the preventative measures and mitigating measures that are implemented in the 
facility in the form of engineering controls and administrative controls, into 
account. 
 
In order to do the initial hazard grading a deterministic approach is followed and 
the Source Term  is calculated and assumptions are made that the total inventory 
Material at Risk is released or a most conservative assumption is made when 
allocating a value to the Material at Risk in order to determine a conservative 
value for the Source Term.  Should the calculated Source Term indicate a 
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consequence or dose impact, as described in the previous paragraphs to turn out to 
be a Hazard Level 0 no further analysis is required and the basic ALARA and 
Defence-in-Depth principles will be applied.  Should the Hazard Level  be higher 
than a Hazard Level  0, extended analysis should be done in correlation with the 
magnitude of the outcome of the calculation.  Various methodologies can then be 
applied to identify release scenarios.  A probabilistic approach is then followed 
when the detriment (consequence) of an event is not acceptable and it now 
requires to demonstrate that the frequency or probability of such an event 
occurring is within acceptable limits and sufficient mitigation and control 
measures are in place to manage the risk. 
 
The advantages of both approaches/techniques can be summarised as follows: 
 
• Main Advantages of a Deterministic Approach 
- Minimum reliance on probabilities. 
- Use of conservative analysis methodologies. 
- Insistence on Defence-in-Depth (e.g. single failure criterion). 
- Easier to apply than probabilistic risk approach when doing initial 
hazard grading (less detail of equipment reliability needed). 
 
• Main Advantages of a Probabilistic Risk Approach 
- Takes equipment reliability fully into account. 
- Considers much wider scope of events (e.g. multiple failures 
beyond single failure). 
- Addresses the question of “how safe is safe enough?”. 
- Gives a balanced, realistic assessment of safety. 
- Provides deep insight into nuclear safety. 
 
Both processes will be applied during the performance of the Radioactive Effluent 
Treatment Facility Safety Assessment.  This Safety Assessment process will 
follow a “bottom-up” approach involving identification of sources of radioactivity 
and potential release/exposure pathways which could pose a hazard.  The 
magnitude of these sources will be calculated following an unmitigated approach.  
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If the unmitigated consequence is too high the probabilistic approach will be 
applied.  Barriers and means to mitigate events will be identified and if sufficient 
barriers are not present, additional barriers will be recommended.  Conservative, 
probabilistic analysis and decision-making will be applied accordingly to 
determine the risk of operating the facility. 
 
While performing a Safety Assessment the following principles must be applied:   
• Hazards that could result in major events (serious consequences) should be 
managed such that the likelihood of occurring is very small.  Smaller 
hazards, with a limited consequence must be more or less inversely 
proportional to the probability of occurring.  This principle focuses more 
attention on main risk contributors, aiming to balance the risks.   
• The likelihood of accidents, challenging the first safety barrier, should be 
extremely low.  
• No single credible accident damages the first safety barrier (beyond a 
certain level of tolerance) or exceeds any safety goal. 
• Consideration must be given to the cumulative consequences of events, 
including extremely unlikely events.   
 
When performing a probabilistic Safety Assessment the above principles need to 
be applied and that also requires the categorisation of events as follows [30]: 
• Intended by design:  Anticipated normal operation >1y-1 (e.g. small 
spillages). 
• Possible abnormal conditions:  Upset conditions (practically expected 
during the lifetime of the facility) 10-2 y-1 . 
• Less probable but credible:  Accident conditions (possible to 
improbable) 10-2 - 10-6 y-1. 
• Extremely unlikely/incredible:  Accident conditions (extremely unlikely 
e.g. criticality) < 10-6 y-1. 
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To enable the management of risk to comply with the above categorization of 
events specific engineering and administrative controls are implemented and are 
known as Items Relied on for Safety (IROFS). 
 
Administrative controls are generally not considered to be as reliable as 
engineered controls since human error usually occurs more frequently than 
equipment failure [31].  Engineered controls may be categorized as either 
“passive” or “active” controls.  A typical passive engineering control is the use of 
shielded rooms.  Active controls for example include equipment such as switches 
that will terminate an action or stop the operation of a piece of equipment when 
for instance unauthorised access has been gained to an open source.  Active 
engineering control often used is the purging of equipment with an inert gas such 
as nitrogen to prevent any explosions or fires by the creation of an inert 
atmosphere.  In general, passive controls are considered to be less prone to failure 
than active controls.  A passive control such as shielding is fixed while a nitrogen 
supply could fail. 
 
11.5.1 3.3.3 Defence-in-Depth   
 
The concept of Defence-in-Depth, which concerns the protection of both the 
Public and the workers, is fundamental to the safety of nuclear installations [3, 5].  
The concept of Defence-in-Depth, as applied to all safety activities, whether 
organizational, behavioural or design related, ensures that they are subject to 
overlapping provisions, so that if a failure were to occur it would be detected and 
compensated for or corrected by appropriate measures.  This idea of multiple 
levels of protection, or lines of defence, is the central feature of Defence-in-Depth. 
 
The strategy for Defence-in-Depth is twofold:  first, to prevent accidents and 
second if prevention fails to limit (or mitigate) their potential consequences and 
prevent any evolution to more serious conditions.  Accident prevention is, 
however, the first priority. 
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It is important to understand the principles of Defence-in-Depth and to understand 
the levels of defence applied in the facility that are assessed. 
 
Defence-in-Depth is generally structured in five levels: 
Level 1: The aim of the first level of defence is to prevent deviations from 
normal operation and to prevent systems failures. 
Level 2: The aim of the second level of defence is to detect and intercept 
deviations from normal operational states in order to prevent 
anticipated operational occurrences from escalating to accident 
conditions. 
Level 3: The aim of this level of defence is to control the accident (should it 
develop to that stage) within the plant design basis. 
Level 4: The aim of the fourth level of defence is the control of severe plant 
conditions, including prevention of accident progression and mitigation 
of the consequences of severe accidents. 
Level 5: The fifth and final level of defence is aimed at mitigation of the 
radiological consequences of potential releases of radioactive material 
that may result from accident conditions. 
 
It cannot be emphasised enough that the choice of methodology and processes 
applied during the performance of a Safety Assessment is difficult and crucial to 
ensure optimum results.  There are a number of Safety Assessment evaluation 
methods that may be used to analyse process hazards.  Safety Assessment 
techniques focus either on an inductive (bottom-up) or a deductive (top-down) 
analysis approach.  If the system is complex and the boundaries of uncertainty are 
big it is recommended to apply more than one methodology to decrease the level 
of uncertainty and gain confidence in the results of the analysis. 
 
During the application of the Inductive approach the possible sequence of failures 
or deviations during normal operation that must occur to result in an event are 
identified.  Normally, it is recommended to apply the Inductive methods for 
analysing single-failure events.  The Deductive method again is applied to 
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identifying combinations of equipment failures and human error that can result in 
an accident (i.e. multi-failure events).  In other words, the Inductive approach is 
useful in identifying a broad range of potential accidents.  The Deductive 
approach, on the other hand, provides a deeper understanding of the mechanism 
by which a particular accident might occur and help to identify the possible 
combinations of failures and root causes that could lead to an accident.  By 
identifying the root causes, the Deductive approach can provide assurance that 
common-mode failures are understood and are properly addressed.  For a complex 
system with a high probability of failure, it is recommended to apply both 
methods and to compare the results.  It is very assuring and useful to combine two 
types of techniques, using the Inductive approach (e.g. Hazard and Operability 
study (HAZOP) and Failure Mode and Effective Analysis (FMEA)) to identify the 
broad range of potential accidents and the Deductive approach (qualitative Fault-
Tree) to analyse the most significant of those accidents (or any other that are 
postulated) in detail. 
 
The various Safety Assessment methodologies are well developed processes and 
are well documented in IAEA guideline documents as well as engineering design 
literature studies.  The hazard level or risk of a facility will dictate the use of 
various methodologies instead of just applying one method to identify hazards and 
evaluate these hazards. 
 
When the hazard level or hazard grading of a facility is initially determined low,  
the Safety Assessment methodologies applied to evaluate the hazards could be 
limited to an elementary safety review consisting of hazard identification 
checklists and a ranking of the identified hazards.  A facility initially rated as a 
Hazard Level 1 dictates the use of more intense methods of risk assessment and 
renders the compilation of a Preliminary Hazard Analysis by performing a What-
If Analysis, HAZOP and FMEA.  The following methods: 
• Safety Review 
• Checklist Analysis 
• Relative Ranking 
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• Preliminary Hazard Analysis 
• What-If Analysis 
are considered to be particularly useful when a broad identification and overview 
of hazards are required.   
 
The application of the complete Safety Assessment Methodologies is required to 
justify the safety of a facility evaluated as a Hazard Level 2 or 3.  The methods 
applied for the evaluation of a Hazard Level 1 facility should be used and in 
addition the following methods or part thereof should be applied: 
• System and component reliability 
• Availability and maintainability analyses 
• Fault Tree Analysis 
• Event Tree Analysis 
• Cause-Consequence Analysis 
• Human Reliability Analysis 
• Performance of a Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA). 
 
Methods such as the What-If Analysis, HAZOP and FMEA are more suitable for 
performing detailed analyses of a wide range of hazards to identify potential 
accident sequences.  These methods lay the foundation to enable the performance 
of more detailed accident analysis as required for the evaluation of facilities with 
higher hazard classifications.  The Fault Tree Analysis, Event Tree Analysis, 
Cause-Consequence Analysis and Human Reliability Analysis are applied to 
provide an in-depth analysis of specific accidents that have been identified 
through the use of the other methods mentioned above.  In general, their use 
requires a higher degree of analyst expertise and increased time and effort. 
 
These methods are all considered “qualitative” methods in the sense that they can 
provide important insights useful for reducing risk without requiring a quantitative 
estimation of risk.  QRA, which is most often used when the consequences of an 
accident are severe e.g. nuclear criticality accidents, is a technique that provides 
quantitative estimates of the risk of accidents.  In addition to providing 
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information useful for prioritising measures for reducing risk, QRA can also be 
used to demonstrate that the frequency of occurrence of a severe accident is 
acceptably small when measured against regulatory criteria. 
 
Once the applicable methodologies have been utilised to evaluate a facility the 
results are specifically used to identify the critical items that are relied on to 
manage these hazards, the so-called Items Relied On For Safety (IROFS).  In 
addition to the identification of the specific IROFS the Safety Assessment must 
evaluate whether the system of IROFS in place in a process will make the 
identified accidents sufficiently unlikely in order to meet the risk criteria as 
specified in national and international standards and as mentioned in the accident 
classification in [30]. 
 
Administrative controls are generally not considered as very reliable IROFS in 
comparison with engineered measures since human error usually occurs more 
frequently than equipment failures.  It should, however, be noted that engineering 
measures, especially active engineered measures, are as reliable as the Quality 
Plan (QP) that ensure the functioning of these controls.  An Operating Technical 
Specification (OTS) for any facility should be written specifying which IROFS 
should be functioning in order to allow operation of a facility.  The functioning of 
the IROFS described in the OTS are again maintained and inspected according to 
a Quality Plan that includes an inspection and maintenance plan.  Again it must be 
emphasised that the Safety Assessment process will identify hazards of a facility 
and quantify the associated risk of the facility but additional measures should be 
implemented to ensure that the processes in place to manage the risks are also 
maintained.  The maintenance of these processes is not a function of the Safety 
Assessment.  Credit is taken for these processes during the compilation of the 
Safety Assessment and if these processes are not maintained the Safety 
Assessment assumptions become invalid. 
 
In summary, to provide reasonable assurance that a particular accident sequence 
will not occur, the Safety Assessment should not only identify the controls that 
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have been implemented, but also reference the specific features of its safety 
program (i.e. training, quality assurance, inspection, maintenance, calibration and 
surveillance) that ensure the reliability of those controls. 
 
The Safety Assessment takes credit for a QP or for quality assurance measures 
that ensure that the IROFS identified are implemented to satisfy the design 
criteria.  The QP will also confirm that personnel are trained and that the 
equipment and IROFS are maintained and inspected to ensure functionality when 
called on during an accident.  Audits and inspections should be part of the quality 
plan and should be conducted to determine whether standard operating procedures 
are being followed and if the inspections and maintenance are executed to ensure 
that the Safety Assessment does not become invalid. 
 
During the operation of the Radioactive Effluent Treatment Facility the sources of 
radioactive material are limited to the Medium Activity and Low Activity Effluent 
received from the various generators.  These sources differ from batch to batch of 
varying quantities.  For the analysis process the most conservative quantity and 
activity were used in determining the possible exposure. 
 
3.4 Analysis and Results of the Safety Assessment of the Necsa 
Radioactive Effluent Treatment Facility 
 
Health effects have been studied since the invention and application of X-rays by 
Wilhelm Conrad Röntgen in 1895.  The results of these studies and related 
research [32] are periodically updated and published as the recommendations of 
the International Commission for Radiological Protection (ICRP) [8]. 
 
The Necsa Radioactive Effluent Treatment Facility has a well-established 
Radiation Protection program [40] and the work areas are surveyed continuously.  
The work areas are zoned according to the prevailing radiation and contamination 
levels.  Workers do not normally enter the rooms where the Medium Activity 
Effluent storage tanks are located.  These rooms, also referred to as cells are 
constructed from reinforced concrete as shielding material.   Entry to the cells is 
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controlled and access is only allowed with a Radiation Protection Officer present.  
Since no entry is required during normal operation, a radiological work permit 
will be issued to describe the actions required to be performed inside the cell and 
the personal protective equipment required as well as the additional radiation 
protection equipment.  This is an example of an administrative control measure 
implemented in the Radioactive Effluent Treatment Facility, to control the risk 
associated with radiological hazards.  The radiation outside the cells is measured 
to be 1 µSvh-1. The contamination level is less than 4 Bqcm-2 for β- emitters.  
These levels are maintained by the ventilation system. According to the survey 
history of the facility, the highest surface contamination inside the cells was 
20 000 kBqm-2 (2 000 Bqcm-2) after a spillage. The operation of the ventilation 
system is described in the Safety Assessment and the Operating Technical 
Specifications was derived from the Safety Assessment.  The ventilation of the 
Radioactive Effluent Treatment Facility is one of the major Items Relied On For 
Safety (IROFS) that is an active engineering measure and is part of a formal 
maintenance and inspection programme.  Shielding is also an important IROFS in 
the Radioactive Effluent Treatment Facility and is part of the passive engineering 
measures.   
 
The equations published in the IAEA Safety Series [6] were used to calculate 
external and internal dose to a worker during normal and accidental exposure.  
The conversion factors for 137Cs were used [6].  Exposure to the Public is not 
applicable for the Medium Activity Facility because no Medium Activity Effluent 
is discharged into the nearby river and all sources of radiation generated from 
Medium Activity Effluent are contained within the building. 
 
The following equations were be used to calculate the dose to a worker due to 
normal operation of the facility.  These same equations were used to calculate the 
dose to a worker due to an accidental exposure. 
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12.5.1 3.4.1 Dose calculation for internal radiation (Inhalation)  
(Equation was adapted for required application) [33] 
 
The general equation for estimating the committed dose by inhalation received by 
the individuals defined in the operation of the Radioactive Effluent Treatment 
facility exposure scenario for radionuclide i (137Cs) is: 
  
GHIJ,L = MNOPHIJ,L(QRQS,L +  QT,LUP),                                                              (3.1) 
 
where the different terms are defined as follows: 
HHIJ,W  The committed effective dose equivalent from one year’s 
intake of radionuclide i by inhalation (Svy-1) 
M  Ventilation/Breathing rate of the worker (m3h-1) (taken as 1.2 
m
3h-1 in this analysis) 
N  Duration of exposure for the individual (hy-1) 
OPHIJ,L  Committed effective dose equivalent per unit intake: (SvBq-1) 
QR  The concentration of Respirable dust in air (gm-3) (The level 
depends on the dust generation potential by the operational 
actions) 
QS,L  The non-diluted concentration of radionuclide i in material at 
risk (Bqg-1) 
QT,L  The concentration of radionuclide i present as surface 
contamination (Bqcm-2) 
UP  The re-suspension factor for surface activity (m-1).  
  
 
Input data used in the calculation of dose due to Inhalation are given in Table 3.3. 
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Table 3.3: Input data used in the calculation of dose due to Inhalation 
 
Value Legend/Meaning 
1.2 Ventilation/Breathing rate of the worker (m3h-1) (taken as the 
inhalation rate for light activity in this analysis) 
2 x 103  Duration of exposure for the individual (hy-1).  This is taken as 8 
hour shifts for 250 days per annum working on 2000 hours. 
4.8 x 10-9 Committed effective dose equivalent per unit intake: (SvBq-1) 
Table II.1II: Committed Effective Dose per unit intake via 
inhalation for 137Cs (SvBq-1)  ( p 126)[6] 
It must be noted that 137Cs has a very high conversion factor 
compared to most of the other nuclides 131I, 60Co etc. that could 
also be present in the Medium Activity Effluent.  Allocating all the 
activity to 137Cs is very conservative.  
1 x 103  The concentration of Respirable dust in air (gm-3) (The level 
depends on the dust generation potential by the operational 
actions).   
This value is taken from the Radioactive Effluent Treatment 
Facility survey results as real measured values.  The surveys are 
performed according to an approved QP and Radiation Protection 
Programme. 
1 The non-diluted concentration of radionuclide i in material at risk 
(Bqg-1). 
The radioactive effluent received from the client is contained 
throughout the Radioactive Effluent Treatment Facility processes 
and the workers are not exposed to direct contact with the 
radioactive effluent.  
4 x 104 The concentration of radionuclide i present as surface 
contamination (Bqm-2) Taken as average real measured values in 
facility for Beta contamination (4 Bqcm-2).   
1 x 10-6 The re-suspension factor for surface activity (m-1).   
 
The radioactive effluent received from the client is contained 
throughout the Radioactive Effluent Treatment Facility processes 
and the workers are not exposed to direct contact with the 
radioactive effluent.  During loss of containment the cleaning of 
the area is done under the control measures of a radiological work 
permit and respiratory protection will be worn. 
 
Evaluation of the component internal radiation (Inhalation) using Eq. (3.1) yields 
the following value: 
 
GHIJ,L = 4.72 x 10
=Y Svy=*. 
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13.5.1 3.4.2 Dose calculation for internal radiation (Ingestion) 
  (Equation adapted for required application) [33].  
 
The general equation for estimating the committed dose by ingestion received by 
the individuals defined in the operation of the Radioactive Effluent Treatment 
facility exposure scenario for radionuclide i (137Cs) is: 
 
GHI[,L = NOPHI[,L(DQHI[,L +  D$\PHI[,LQT,L),                                                 (3.2) 
 
where the different terms are defined as follows: 
GHI[,L   The committed effective dose equivalent from one year’s 
intake of radionuclide i by ingestion  (Svy-1) 
N  Duration of exposure for the individual (hy-1) 
OPHI[,L  The committed effective dose equivalent for ingestion of 1 Bq 
of radionuclide i (SvBq-1)   
 D  Rate of secondary ingestion of removable surface 
contamination (g/h-1)  
QHI[,L  The concentration of radionuclide i in the removable dust 
(Bqg-1) 
D$  Rate of secondary ingestion of removable surface 
contamination  (m2h-1) 
\PHI[,L  The transfer fraction for ingestion of surface activity 
QT,L  Concentration of radionuclide i present as surface 
contamination (Bqm-2). 
 
Input data used in the calculation of dose due to Ingestion are given in Table 3.4. 
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Table 3.4: Input data used in the calculations of dose due to Ingestion 
 
Value Legend/Meaning 
2 x 103  Duration of exposure for the individual (hy-1) 
1.3 x 10-8 The committed effective dose equivalent for ingestion of 1 Bq of 
radionuclide i (SvBq-1). 
 Table II.1II: Committed Effective Dose per unit intake via 
ingestion for 137Cs (SvBq-1)  ( p 126)[6] 
4.17 x 10-3 Rate of secondary ingestion of removable surface contamination 
(gh-1). 
This value is for children which by implication would be less for 
adults. Value is 0.1 gd-1 by a mouthing frequency of 10 times a 
day.  Value is taken and divided by 24 to obtain an hourly rate. 
1 The concentration of radionuclide i in the removable dust (Bqg-1) 
1 x 10-4 Rate of secondary ingestion of removable surface contamination 
(m2h-1). 
 
Note: Taken from the information used in [6] and [33]. 
1 x 10-2 The transfer fraction for ingestion of surface activity.  
 
This value is assumed conservatively because the radioactive 
effluent received from the client is contained throughout the 
Radioactive Effluent Treatment Facility processes and the 
workers are not exposed to direct contact with the radioactive 
effluent. 
4 x 104 Concentration of radionuclide i present as surface contamination 
(Bqm-2) Taken as average measured in facility for Beta 
contamination (4 Bqcm-2) 
 
Evaluation of the component internal radiation (Ingestion) using Eq. (3.2) yields 
the following value: 
 
GHI[,L = 4.59 x 10
=- Svy=*. 
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14.5.1 3.4.3 External radiation  
(Equation adapted for required application) [33].  
 
The general equation for estimating the effective dose equivalent received by the 
individuals defined in the operation of the Radioactive Effluent Treatment facility 
exposure scenario for radionuclide i (137Cs) is: 
 
G]^_,L,` = NQLOP]^_,L,` ,                                                                                      (3.3) 
 
where the different terms are defined as follows: 
G]^_,L,`  The effective dose equivalent form one year’s external 
exposure to radionuclide i (or to photons of energy i) in 
source category s (Svy-1) 
N  Duration of exposure h to the individual (hy-1) 
QL  The initial concentration of radionuclide i (or to photons 
of energy i) in the material handled Bqg-1 
OP]^_,L,`  The effective dose equivalent from external exposures to 
radionuclide i (or to photons of energy i) in source 
category s (Svh-1 per Bqg-1). 
 
Input data used in the calculation of dose due to External Radiation are given in 
Table 3.5. 
 
Table 3.5: Input data used in the calculations of dose due to External Radiation 
 
Value Legend/Meaning 
2 000 Duration of exposure h to the individual (hy-1) 
1 x 10-6 Activity Ai (Real measured value in the facility outside the cells 
already converted to Svh-1) 
(2.5 x 10-5 Svh-1 is the average value inside the cells but no 
worker will spend 2 000 hy-1 inside a cell.  The average value 
outside the cells was used because this is also conservative seeing 
that the workers will not be inside the facility for 2000 hy-1 but 
spend most of the time inside the control room.)   
 
Equation (3.3) was adapted because real measured values are available and are 
used knowing the activity Ai in the facility outside the cells: 
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G]^_,L,` = NaL,`                                                                                                   (3.4)  
 
Evaluation of the component External Radiation using Eq. (3.4) yields the 
following value:  
 
G]^_,L,` = 2.00 x 10
=% Svy=*. 
 
15.5.1 3.4.4 Total dose to an operator  
 
The dose (DTOT) for the total task must be such that the operator will not exceed 
the ALARA limit of 4 mSv.  Additional dose will be allowed to emergency 
workers but on a controlled basis, this will not be discussed in this Safety 
Assessment.  Thus DTOT is given by [6]: 
 
O_b_ = GHIJ,L + GHI[,L  + G]^_,L,` .                                                             (3.5) 
 
where the different terms are defined as follows: 
O_b_  Total accumulated dose (Svy-1) 
GHIJ,L  The committed effective dose equivalent from one year’s 
intake of radionuclide i by inhalation (Svy-1) (Eq. (3.1)) 
GHI[,L   The committed effective dose equivalent from one year’s 
intake of radionuclide i by ingestion  (Svy-1) (Eq. (3.2)) 
G]^_,L,`  The effective dose equivalent form one year’s external 
exposure to radionuclide i (or to photons of energy i) in 
source category s (Sv.y-1) (Eq. (3.3) or Eq. (3.4)). 
 
Thus the total dose to operator during normal operations using Eq. (3.5) yields the 
following value: 
 
O_b_ = 4.72 x 10
=Y + 4.59 x  10=- + 2.00 x 10=%  
 
O_b_ = 2.00 ±  0.1 x 10
=% Svy=* . 
 
The External Radiation component is the only significant contributing factor to 
the annual dose to a worker due to normal operations.  The External Radiation 
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outside the cells is measured during daily surveys with an electronic radiation 
monitor.  The instrumentation used in the Radioactive Effluent Treatment Facility 
at Necsa is calibrated yearly.  An error of not more than 10% is guaranteed by the 
suppliers and this is confirmed during the calibration of all instruments.  The 
lower the concentration of the specific nuclides present the higher the error in the 
readings of the instruments will be.  The detection efficiency of the instrument 
increase with increase in concentration of nuclides. 
 
3.5 Operator exposure due to abnormal operations and accidents 
 
Scenario:  Operator exposed to internal and external radiation from 
radioactive effluent material being released due to a broken transfer line.  
 
An assumption is made that the Medium Activity Effluent transfer line ruptures 
during the transfer of radioactive effluent from the client/generator to the storage 
tanks inside the Radioactive Effluent Treatment Facility.  A release of 8 m3 (8 000 
litres) is assumed before the operators manage to close the valves.  The Medium 
Activity Effluent evaporates leaving contamination on the floor that becomes 
airborne.  The operator spends one shift cleaning up the contamination without 
wearing PPE.  He is exposed to internal and external radiation.   
 
The highest activity of Medium Activity Effluent ever recorded at the Radioactive 
Effluent Treatment Facility was 9.8 x 107 Bqℓ-1.  This value will be used during 
the simulation of the accident scenario.  This is a conservative approach by 
assuming the type of failure of equipment and by using the highest activity of 
radioactive effluent received at the Radioactive Effluent Treatment Facility. 
 
Tables 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8 list values used for the calculation of internal radiation 
(Inhalation) Eq. (3.1), internal radiation (Ingestion) Eq. (3.2) and external 
radiation Eq. (3.3), respectively. 
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Table 3.6: Input data used in the calculations of dose due to Inhalation from an 
accidental exposure for Eq. (3.1). 
 
Value Legend/Meaning 
1.2 Ventilation/Breathing rate of the worker (m3/h) (taken as the 
inhalation rate for light activity in this analysis) 
8 Duration of exposure for the individual (h).  This is taken as one 8 
hour shift.  
4.8 x 10-9 Committed effective dose equivalent per unit intake: (Sv/Bq) 
1 x 10-3 The concentration of respirable dust in air (g.m-3) (The level 
depends on the dust generation potential by the operational actions).  
The activity involves cleaning of surfaces and the most 
conservative value of 1 x 10-3 was taken from Table II.2 [33].  
 
With mobile radionuclides such as 99Tc and 137 Cs, the activity is 
expected to volatize and exhaust through the off-gas system.   
9.8 x 104 The non-diluted concentration of radionuclide i in material at risk 
(Bqg-1). 
Taking activity as 9.8 x 107 Bqℓ-1 from highest measured values in 
Radioactive Effluent Treatment Facility.   
Converting Bqℓ-1 to Bqm-3: 
9.8 x 107 (Bq/l) = 9.8 x1010 Bqm-3 
Converting Bqℓ-1to Bqg-1:  
Taking density of water as 1000 kgm-3 
Activity 9.8 x 107 Bqkg-1 = 9.8 x 104 Bqg-1 
2 x 107 The concentration of radionuclide i present as surface 
contamination (Bqm-2).  
The value used here is the highest value measured in the past during 
an event (lost of containment) in the cells.   
Concentration of radionuclide i present as surface contamination.  
1 x 10-5 The re-suspension factor for surface activity (m-1).  
The re-suspension factor referenced in [33] is used. 
 
When a relatively insoluble contaminant has been deposited on a 
surface, it may again be re-suspended into the air and thus become a 
significant contributor to the inhalation and ingestion pathways to 
persons at some point in time following deposition of the 
contaminant. 
 
The type of actions and the wind characteristics influences the re-
suspension factor.  The nuclear event is contained in the building 
and the meteorological conditions will thus not influence the re-
suspension factor.  
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Evaluation of the component internal radiation (Inhalation) caused by exposure as 
described in the accident scenario using Eq. (3.1) yields the following value: 
 
GHIJ,L = 1.37 x 10
=& Sv. 
 
Input data used in the calculation of dose due to Ingestion from an accidental 
exposure are given in Table 3.7. 
 
Table 3.7: Input data used in the calculations of dose due to Ingestion from an 
accidental exposure for Eq. (3.2). 
 
Value Legend/Meaning 
8 Duration of exposure for the individual (h).  This is taken as one 8 
hour shift. 
1.3 x 10-8 The committed effective dose equivalent for ingestion of 1 Bq of 
radionuclide i (SvBq-1).  
4.17 x 10-3 Rate of secondary ingestion of removable surface contamination 
(gh-1). 
This value is for children which by implication would be less for 
adults. Value is 0.1 gd-1 by a mouthing frequency of 10 times a 
day.  Value is taken and divided by 24 to obtain an hourly rate. 
9.8 x 104 The concentration of radionuclide i in the removable dust (Bqg-1) 
1 x 10-4 Rate of secondary ingestion of removable surface contamination 
(m2h-1). 
0.01 The transfer fraction for ingestion of surface activity was taken 
from the example in [33], there is no specific data available for 
this scenario.    
2 x 107 Concentration of radionuclide i present as surface contamination 
(Bqm-2)  
The value used here is a value measured in the past during an 
event (lost of containment) in the cells.   
Concentration of radionuclide i present as surface contamination.  
2 000 Bqcm-2 
 
Evaluation of the component internal radiation (Ingestion) caused by exposure as 
described in the accident scenario using Eq. (3.2) yields the following value: 
 
GHI[,L = 4.46 x 10
=& Sv . 
 
Input data used in the calculation of dose due to External Radiation from an 
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accidental exposure are given in Table 3.8. 
 
Table 3.8:  Input data used in the calculations of dose due to External Radiation 
from an accidental exposure for Eq. (3.3). 
 
Value Legend/Meaning 
8 Duration of exposure h to the individual (hy-1) 
9.8 x 104 The initial concentration of radionuclide i (or to photons of energy 
i) in the material handled Bqg-1 
2.1 x 10-8  The effective dose equivalent from external exposures to 
radionuclide i (or to photons of energy i) in source category s 
(Svh-1 per Bqg-1). 
 
Evaluation of the component external radiation caused by exposure as described 
in the accident scenario using Eq. (3.3) yields the following value: 
 
G]^_,L,` = 1.65 x 10
=$ Sv . 
 
Thus the total dose to operator during accidental scenario using Eq. (3.5) is 
calculated as: 
 
O_b_ = 1.37 x 10
=Y + 4.46 x 10=&  + 1.65 x 10=$ Sv 
 
O_b_ = 1.65 ±  0.1 x 10
=$ Sv 
 
The External Radiation component is the only significant contributing factor to in 
the case of accidental exposure.  The same instruments that are used during 
normal operation surveys are also used in the case of accidental releases and 
nuclear occurrences.  An error of not more than 10% is guaranteed by the 
suppliers and this is confirmed during the calibration of the instruments.  The 
detection efficiency of the instrument increase with increase in concentration of 
nuclides.  The readings on the instrumentation used during an unexpected high 
release of radioactive material will be very accurate. 
 
The total dose to an operator during accidental scenario is well within the Hazard 
Level 1 objectives as described in Section 3.2.1.  The consequences of the 
accident is localised at the facility.  Due to this low value of the total dose no 
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further hazard analysis is required to determine the probability of such an accident 
occurring.  However if the potential total dose was above 20 mSv for the 
accidental scenario, the probability of such an accident occurring would have to 
be determine.  Two well known methods used to determine the probability of an 
accident occurring are Fault Tree Analysis or Event Tree Analysis.  
 
16.5.1 3.5.1 Accident Fault Tree analysis 
 
Fault Tree Analysis attempts to model and analyse failure processes of 
engineering systems.  It is basically composed of logic diagrams, as shown in 
Fig. 3.4 that display the state of the system and is constructed using graphical 
design techniques.  It can also be defined as another part or technique of reliability 
engineering and is applied where errors are intolerable (e.g. operation of nuclear 
reactors).  It is used as a design tool to identify potential accidents and to ensure 
that these potential accidents are engineered out or the probability of occurring is 
decreased to an acceptable level.  It is thus used in safety engineering and during 
the execution of Safety Assessments. 
 
During the performance of a Fault Tree Analysis an undesired effect/accident is 
taken as the root (Top Event) of the tree logic.  There should always be only one 
Top Event and all concerns must tree down from the one Top Event.  Each 
situation that could cause that effect is added to the tree as a series of the logic 
expression.  Each effect can be labelled with an actual number if it is available, (in 
practice values are not normally available due to lack of historical trend and 
because of the expense of testing).  If no values are available the Fault Tree 
Analysis is only used as a tool to identify critical equipment/items that would 
require defence in depth mechanisms to protect against failure or to mitigate the 
consequences of failure. 
 
Figure 3.4 is included to demonstrate the application of the Fault Tree Analysis 
methodology for the various actions that need to take place to lead to the exposure 
of an operator to Medium Activity Effluent at Necsa. 
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Figure 3.4: Simplified Fault Tree of the Accident Scenario 
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The Fault Tree Analysis uses conventional logic gate symbols (AND/OR gate 
symbols).  If more than one failure needs to result in an effect, the “AND” gate 
symbol is used.  When only one failure in a series of potential failures will result 
in an effect, the “OR” gate is used. 
 
The Fault Tree Analysis involves five basic steps: 
• define the undesired event to study, 
• obtain an understanding of the systems that are to be analysed, 
• construct the Fault Tree, 
• evaluate the Fault Tree and 
• control the hazards (failure modes) identified. 
 
An Event Tree Analysis starts from an undesired initiator (e.g. loss of a critical 
component) and follows possible further system events through to a series of final 
consequences.  As each new event is considered, a new node on the event tree is 
added and the probability of each branch of the tree is evaluated.  It is not needed 
to apply both methodologies during the compilation of a Safety Assessment.  
There are no definite advantages or disadvantages between applying the Fault 
Tree Analysis or the Event Tree Analysis, it is a matter of personal preference. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The aim of this Safety Assessment was to demonstrate the safe operation of the 
Radioactive Effluent Treatment Facility at Necsa and the management of risk 
associated with the operation of a Radioactive Effluent Treatment Facility. 
 
Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 give a summary of the various Safety Assessment steps 
followed in this Safety Assessment and the results found are given in Table 4.3.  
This report covers the methodology of the Safety Assessment process in detail but 
not all the steps as demonstrated in Fig. 3.1 in Chapter 3 were addressed in detail.  
Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 discuss the reasoning followed during the execution of the 
Safety Assessment according to the methodology demonstrated in Fig. 3.1. 
 
As can be seen from Table 4.3, the workers of the Radioactive Effluent Treatment 
Facility’s occupational exposure dose due to normal operation is well within the 
IAEA standards [6]  and the ICRP recommendations on exposure of 50 mSvy-1 
[8], and within the Necsa ALARA objective set at 4 mSv/a [5]. 
 
The management of the safe operation of the Radioactive Effluent Treatment 
Facility at Necsa according to national and international best practise is achieved 
in the specific areas that were evaluated in this Safety Assessment. 
 
The principles of ALARA for the workers are applied by limiting time spent in 
classified areas, reducing radiation levels prior to entering an area, monitoring 
worker exposure etc.  The ALARA objective for the workers of Necsa is that the 
average annual effective dose to the occupationally exposed workforce of Necsa 
shall not exceed 4 mSvy-1.  The exposure dose level set by the ICRP is 50 mSvy-1 
[8] and the value set by the NNR is 20 mSvy-1[5].  Only as an application of the 
ALARA principle it is recommended that a project must be registered to 
investigate the shielding of the Medium Activity Effluent pipes that are currently 
unshielded.   
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Table 4.1:  Summary of the Safety Assessment process steps followed during the 
evaluation of normal operating conditions of the Radioactive Effluent 
Treatment Facility. 
 
Description of Steps of Safety 
Assessment as illustrated in Fig. 3.1. Comments 
Facility description 
A detail description of the facility to be 
assessed was compiled and discussed in 
Chapter 1, Section 1.3.  The boundaries 
of the Safety Assessment were limited to 
inside the facilities and no influence 
from or on neighbouring facilities were 
analysed. The Radioactive Effluent 
Treatment Facility at Necsa is located 
downhill from the neighbouring facilities 
and loss of containment will be 
contained within the facility.   
Facility description should include a 
description of neighbouring facilities 
in order to demonstrate that the 
facility to be analysed will have an 
influence or not on the neighbouring 
facilities.   
Normal Operation 
Public Exposure 
The public exposure due to possible 
releases that are part of the normal 
operations must be determined for each 
action but due to the nearest member of 
the public being located more than 1 km 
from the Radioactive Effluent Treatment 
Facility at Necsa and all action with 
regard to liquid effluent is contained 
within the building, the Public exposure 
was not determined. 
The exposure due to the discharge of 
radioactive effluent was excluded 
from this report.     
Worker Exposure 
The different actions (work breakdown) 
for the Radioactive Effluent Treatment 
Facility at Necsa were not done for this 
Safety Assessment.  It was decided to 
work conservatively on an average 
radiation level measured during the 
operation of the Radioactive Effluent 
Treatment Facility.  This average value 
included maintenance actions.  The 
average annual dose was calculated for 
the workers in the Radioactive Effluent 
Treatment Facility.  This annual dose 
was well within the ALARA objective. 
If the Safety Assessment resulted in 
high average doses, the dose 
associated with each task would 
have been calculated.  This would 
then have been used as a guideline to 
group specific actions together and 
allow operators only to perform 
specific combinations of actions in 
order to limit exposure.  Actions that 
could lead to high doses such as 
maintenance tasks would then be 
managed separately to reduce the 
exposure.   
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Table 4.2:  Summary of the Safety Assessment process steps followed during the 
evaluation of an accidental scenario occurred at the Radioactive 
Effluent Treatment Facility. 
 
Description of Steps of Safety 
Assessment as illustrated in Fig. 3.1. Comments 
Accidental Operation 
Public Exposure 
An accident scenario assumed that there 
will be no loss of containment from the 
facility. 
The realistic accident scenario 
resulted in the Radioactive Effluent 
Treatment Facility at Necsa being 
classified as a Hazard Level 1 
Facility, in other words there would 
be no off-site consequences. 
Worker Exposure 
An accident scenario of the loss of 8 m3 
of Medium Activity Effluent was 
assumed.   Various other scenarios could 
have been evaluated but this scenario 
was seen as a realistic scenario to 
analyse. The outcome of the exposure 
due to the loss of containment was used 
to determine the hazard level of the 
facility.  Because the outcome of the 
possible exposure dose was well within 
the classification of a Hazard Level 1 
Facility no additional assessment was 
done.  The result of the analysis is 
illustrated in Table 4.3. 
A probabilistic analysis of the failure 
of a pipeline was not done.  An 
example of an fault tree that could 
lead to operator exposure was 
included but no failure factors or 
probability was allocated to the fault 
tree.  The deterministic analysis that 
followed resulted in low doses and it 
is thus not necessary to demonstrate 
that barriers are in place to prevent 
operator exposure.   
 
 
 Table 4.3: Summary of the Results of the Safety Assessment in demonstration of 
the Safe Operation of the Radioactive Effluent Treatment Facility 
 
Normal operation 
Dose due to Svy-1 Comment 
Inhalation 4.72  x 10-7   
Dose Limit for normal operation.  
ALARA objective 
4 mSv (4 x 10-3 Sv). 
Ingestion 4.59  x 10-9   
External 
Radiation 2.00  x 10
-3 
  
Total  2.00 ± 0.1 x 10-3   
Accident Exposure 
Dose due to Sv Comment 
Inhalation 1.37 x 10-5   
The dose for a Hazard level 1 is less 
than 20 mSv (2 x 10-2 Sv). 
Ingestion 4.46 x 10-5 
External 
Radiation 1.65  x 10
-2 
  
Total  1.65 ± 0.1 x 10-2   
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The exposure of the workers is very low and the annual medical surveillance of 
the workers of the Radioactive Effluent Treatment Facility at Necsa presented 
acceptable results [36]. 
 
According to the hazard-level rating criteria described in Section 3.2, the 
Radioactive Effluent Treatment Facility at Necsa is classed as a Hazard Level 1 
Facility.  Segments where an unmitigated nuclear event is estimated to have only 
localised consequences at the Facility itself, e.g. a worker who is present at the 
process where the event occurs, receives a dose that exceeds 20 mSv but less than 
50 mSv; no workers in other facilities on site are affected. There are no off-site 
consequences and no member of the public is exposed to annual normal operation 
dose constraint of 0.25 mSv.  The result of the analysis of the accident scenario is 
given in Table 4.3 to demonstrate that the Radioactive Effluent Treatment Facility 
at Necsa is classed as a Hazard Level 1 Facility.  
 
The hazard level rating was derived from the one accident scenario evaluated in 
this report.  The accident scenario is seen as the most conservative scenario but 
small spillages are more likely to occur at a higher frequency.  Despite this 
conservative assumption of an accidental scenario it was still clear that a 
catastrophic release of Medium Activity Effluent will have no off-site 
consequences because it will be contained inside the building and the operator 
will not encounter a dose exceeding 20 mSv for the single event.   
 
The requirements for occupational exposure are [6]: 
The occupational exposure of any worker shall be so controlled that the 
following limits are not exceeded: 
(a) An effective dose of 20 mSv per year averaged over five 
consecutive years (The start of the averaging period shall be 
coincident with the first day of the relevant annual period after 
the date of entry into force of the Standards, with no retroactive 
averaging). 
(b) An effective dose of 50 mSv in any single year. 
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According to the process steps of the Safety Assessment as discussed in 
Chapter 3, Section 3.1 and illustrated in Fig. 3.1 no further analyses were required 
after the initial results were obtained for the public and worker exposure from 
normal operating conditions and accidental exposure scenario.  
 
This Safety Assessment confirms that there are sufficient measures (e.g. shielding, 
containment, personnel monitoring and personal protection etc.) in place to 
prevent the workers from being exposed above ALARA objectives. 
 
Table 4.3 gives a summary of the Results of the Safety Assessment in 
demonstration of the Safe operation of the Radioactive Effluent Treatment 
Facility at Necsa.  
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APPENDIX A:  ALARA PRINCIPLES  
 
Radiation protection can be divided into three categories: 
• occupational radiation protection, which is the protection of workers. 
• medical radiation protection, which is the protection of patients. 
• public radiation protection, which is the protection of individual members 
of the public, and of the population as a whole. 
The types of exposure, as well as government regulations and legal exposure 
limits are different for each of these groups.  Radiation protection must be 
considered separately for each group. 
 
Despite the regulatory limits set for each exposure group the aim of any practice 
must be to lower the doses As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA). 
ALARA is not a dose limit; it is a practice that has as its objective the attainment 
of dose levels as far below applicable limits as possible resulting in a small but 
acceptable level of risk.  
 
ALARA is not simply a phrase, but a work principle, a mindset, a culture of 
professional excellence.  In an ideal world, one could reduce a person’s exposure 
to hazardous materials to zero.  In reality, reducing an exposure to zero is not 
always possible and an approach to control or manage radiation exposures (both 
individual and collective to the workforce and the public) and releases of 
radioactive material to the environment as low as social, technical, economic, 
practical, and public policy considerations permit, was taken instead. 
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The ALARA approach was developed because it is assumed that any exposure to 
ionizing radiation carries some risk.  The risk is assumed to be linear, so as a 
person's exposure increases, so does the risk of adverse health effects.  Instead of 
operating at or just below permissible exposure limits, one must stay as far below 
the exposure limits as possible.  This affords a wider margin of error should a 
control fail or malfunction - one's exposure level may rise but still stay below the 
acceptable limit.  
 
ALARA practices apply to virtually any substance, but are mandated for 
radiation workers by the National Nuclear Regulator.  One can never have "zero" 
radiation exposure because of the naturally occurring radioactivity that surrounds 
us - cosmic rays, natural isotopes in our body etc.  Therefore, the best that can be 
done is to add nothing to this background dose, i.e. to keep the exposure 
ALARA. 
 
In some cases ALARA must be compromised and this is acceptable in the 
application of medical treatment but not in medical diagnosis.   
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APPENDIX B:  EFFECTS OF RADIATION ON BIOLOGICAL SYSTEMS 
 
Whether the source of radiation is natural or man-mad, whether it is a small dose 
of radiation or a large dose, there will be some biological effects.  Most adverse 
health effects on radiation exposure may be grouped in two general categories: 
 
• Deterministic effects (harmful tissue reactions) due to a large extent to the 
killing/malfunctioning of cells following high doses; and 
• Stochastic effects, i.e. cancer and heritable effects involving either cancer 
development in exposed individuals owing to mutation of somatic cells or 
heritable disease in their offspring owing to mutation of reproductive 
(germ) cells. 
 
Deterministic effects:  The induction of tissue reactions is generally characterised 
by a threshold dose.  The reason for the presence of this threshold dose is that 
radiation damage (serious malfunction or death) of a critical population of cells in 
a given tissue needs to be sustained before injury is expressed in a clinically 
relevant form.  Above the threshold dose the severity of the injury, including 
impairment of the capacity for tissue recovery, increases with dose. 
 
Although we tend to think of biological effect in terms of the effect of radiation on 
living cells, in actuality, ionizing radiation, by definition, interacts only with 
atoms by a process called ionization.  All biological damage effects begin with the 
consequence of radiation interactions with the atoms forming the cells.  As a 
result, radiation effects on humans proceed from the lowest to the highest level.  
Summarised:  Radiation causes ionization of atoms, which may affect molecules 
which may affect cells which may affect tissue which may affect organs which 
may affect the whole body. 
 
Even though all subsequent biological effects can be traced back to the interaction 
of radiation with atoms there are two mechanisms by which radiation ultimately 
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affects cells.  The two mechanisms are commonly called direct and indirect 
effects.  Cellular damage is illustrated in Figure B1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure B1:  Illustration of Cellular damage due to radiation. 
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Figure B2:  Direct effect of radiation causing damage to DNA in cells. 
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If radiation interacts with the atoms of the DNA molecule, or some other cellular 
component critical to the survival of the cell, it is referred to as a direct effect.  
Such an interaction may affect the ability of the cell to reproduce and thus survive.  
If enough atoms are affected such that the chromosomes do not replicate properly, 
or if there is significant alteration in the information carried by the DNA 
molecule, then the cell may be destroyed by “direct” interference with its life-
sustaining system as indicated in Figure B2. 
 
Direct Interference 
 
If a cell is exposed to radiation, the probability of the radiation interacting with the 
DNA molecule is very small since these critical components make up such a small 
part of the cell.  However, each cell, just as is the case for the human body, is 
mostly water.  Therefore, there is a much higher probability of radiation 
interacting with the water that makes up most of the cell’s volume. 
 
Indirect Interference 
 
When radiation interacts with water, it may break the bonds that hold the water 
molecules together, producing fragments such as hydrogen (H) and hydroxyls 
(OH).  These fragments may recombine or may interact with other fragments or 
ions to form compounds, such as water, which would not harm the cell.  However, 
they could combine to form toxic substances, such as hydrogen peroxide (H2O2) 
which can contribute to the destruction of the cell.  The radiolytic decomposition 
of water in a cell is illustrated in Figure B3 
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Figure B3:  Radiolytic Decomposition of water in a cell. 
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Not all living cells are equally sensitive to radiation.  Those cells which are 
actively reproducing are more sensitive to radiation.  This is due to the dividing 
cells that require correct DNA information in order for the cell’s off springs to 
survive.  A direct interaction of radiation with an active cell could result in the 
death or mutation of the cell, whereas a direct interaction with the DNA of a 
dormant cell would have less of an effect. 
 
As a result, living cells can be classified according to their rate of reproduction, 
which also indicates their relative sensitivity to radiation.  This means that 
different cell systems have different sensitivities.  Lymphocytes (white blood 
cells) and cells which produce blood are constantly regenerating, and are, 
therefore, the most sensitive.  Reproductive and gastrointestinal cells are not 
regenerating as quickly and are less sensitive.  The nerve and muscle cells are the 
slowest to regenerate and are the least sensitive cells. 
 
Cells like those in the human body have a tremendous ability to repair damage.  
As a result, not all radiation effects are irreversible.  In many instances, the cells 
are able to completely repair any damage and function normally.  The ability to 
completely repair is illustrated in Figure B4. 
 
If the damage is severe enough, the affected cell dies as illustrated in Figure B5.  
In some instances, the cell is damaged but is still able to reproduce.  The daughter 
cells, however, may be lacking in some critical life-sustaining component, and 
they die as illustrated in Figure B6. 
 
The other possible result of radiation exposure is that the cell is affected in such a 
way that it does not die but is simply mutated.  This mutated cell reproduces and 
thus perpetuates the mutation.  This could be the beginning of a malignant tumour 
as illustrated in Figure B7. 
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Figure B4:  Normal repair of damage. 
 
 
 
Figure B5:  Cell dies from damage. 
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Figure B6:  Daughter cells die. 
 
 
 
Figure B7:  No repair or non-identical repair before reproduction. 
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The biological effects on the whole body from exposure to radiation will depend 
upon factors such as: 
 
• total dose,  
• type of cell,  
• type of radiation, 
• age of individual, 
• stage of cell division, 
• part of body exposed, 
• general state of health, 
• tissue volume exposed, 
• time interval over which dose is received.  
 
Besides death, there are several other possible effects of a high radiation dose 
such as skin include erythema (reddening like sunburn), dry desquamation 
(peeling), and moist desquamation (blistering), associated with low energy gamma 
and X-ray radiation.  Hair loss, also called epilation, is similar to skin effects and 
can occur after acute high doses.  Sterility can also occur and depending on the 
dose it can be temporary or permanent.  Cataracts can occur especially with 
neutron radiation due to the high water content in the eye, which is particularly 
effective in stopping neutrons. 
 
Low doses spread over a long period of time rather than an acute dose gives rise 
to non-lethal mutations, with the greatest concern being the induction of cancer. 
 
 
